International Law and the Collapse of Sovereignty

After watching the lecture for this module, one question posed by Professor Jackson stuck with me: can international law be strengthened without doing away with state sovereignty? My answer to this question is a realist response, that state sovereignty cannot exist with the expansion of international law. The mere state of being a member of an international organization with a judicial branch implies that the state is no longer sovereign, no longer having unconditional authority over it's actions. 

The reason for this is fairly simple, by allocating more authority to a body that dictates international law, the state loses a portion of its authority, and a state cannot be autonomous without the monopoly on authority. An important point to note here, is that sovereign states can enforce international law. However, once this is done, autonomy is eradicated. According to Professor Jackson, the superior legal authority within international law, means that states in the international system are no longer fully autonomous. By giving authority to an international body which governs international law, the state is no longer sovereign, and no longer has full autonomy.

To aid in comprehending this idea, let's look at a body that governs international law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, was created as a means to solve legal disputes between member states. By submitting to the Court's jurisdiction, states relinquish a piece of their sovereignty. The state would no longer be autonomous, no longer having all authority to govern itself. The reason for this being that if the state was brought before the Court in a dispute, the state must then adhere to the ruling of the Court, losing authority over that specific matter. Therefore, if a state wishes to remain sovereign, it should abstain from the realm of global governance.

Some people may argue against this idea, claiming that in reality there is a grey area where states can retain sovereignty while international law is strengthened. However, this issue is black and white, either states are sovereign, or they are not. There is simply no middle ground on which to hide from the reality of the international system.


https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/06/international-law-and-collapse-of.html

Week 8 Post Class

Recently the United States has made overtures at recognizing Israel's claim to the Golan Heights. This is significant in that this would be the first time since the end of World War II where the United States would recognize a territory captured by military means. This recognition could potentially set in place a precedent which could grant other states the public authority to recognize other territories captured by military means in the future. Since there is no superior legal authority within the realm of the international, public authority is dictated by precedent, and the willingness of states to follow through with said precedent. This particular precedent bears the threat of a belligerent sovereign using the threat of violence on a smaller state in order to expand their territorial claims inside the smaller state, and then having these territorial claims be recognized by the allies of the belligerent sovereign. Any attempt by other states to disavow this claim to the belligerent's new territoriality would be nominal, as any military action within these new borders can be interpreted by states which recognize this new border as a violation of sovereignty.

A similiar situation occurred after the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state in 2008. Kosovo's territory was located within the sovereign country of Serbia, and (to summarize a complex series of negotions) declared independence in 2008 without the consent of Serbia. Kosovo was promptly recognized by a number of states including the U.S. shortly after declaring itself independent. This set a negative precedent that regional separatist movements do not require any public authority from the sovereign country they are declaring independence from. This precedent was then used by Russia in the Georgian autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to justify military intervention in Georgia to protect the sovereignty of these two regions. One of the main differences between the Golan Heights recognition and the recognition of Kosovo would be that only the U.S. would recognize the Golan Heights and Kosovo received recognition from a broader international audience, however the threat of establishing this precedent still remains and should be taken very seriously.

week 6 post class blog Trump card

This class was very interesting as we had the opportunity to examine the recent summit between President Trump and Kim Jong un.  I really appreciated the hopeful opinion that Emma shared that this may be the opening door for something greater. I however do not feel hopeful about future relations.  I agree with the sentiment that this is more show than anything. Trump has made millions on using smoke and mirrors to trade on his name. I think he continues this same technique with his presidency to maintain his base. There was no real diplomatic presence for this meeting. There are no assurances for a follow on meeting. The United States gained no real concessions and has agreed to pull away from military exercises on the border. I think his style of diplomacy is dangerous and sets a precedent that States can appeal to Trump's ego and gain valuable concessions. I believe that Trump won this for himself and his base but the American people and diplomacy have lost big time. At some point I have to wonder if the United States is near to breaking off from being a rational actor on the international stage.

I tend to fall more along a constructivist lines. I believe that humans have a lot more control over the way we set our social order and are capable of fundamental change.  I will utilize an example from a previous blog post utilizing international women's movements. Today people have access to the freedom of information that has the capability to rapidly transcend international borders. We have seen ISIS move across boarders to execute attacks within the United States as well as Europe. Clearly in the modern world we are faced with a new challenge to identity. With this shift in identity the major players on the international scenes have the potential to be non state actors. One cannot ignore the international business market and their ability to manipulate states in their best interests. Apple is a great example of a power international business organization in the way their moved their headquarters to Ireland. They were so powerful that the current administration set current tax laws to be more favorable.  This sway of powerful companies within government is nothing new however the way in which they clearly move outside a home based country and pit countries against each other shows a new style and autonomy. Technology has allowed dispersed offices to all be in the same room with each other. This allows organizations to break free of the chains of identity based on location and reach out to new markets and people. the increase of technology will only increase the capabilities to reorganize with non state actors.  I think this will continue and ultimately the whole dynamic of power will shift. 

Limits to the control of violence

I thought this weeks topic was an interesting examination of the question of statehood in the face of the growing presence of transnational organizations and international systems of law.

In theory, states should place the limits to the control of violence as the highest priority on their list. Without the "monopoly on the legitimate use of violence," state sovereigns cede authority, and if they are replaced as the legitimate source of the use of violence then they ultimately forfeit their sovereignty. Privatization may supplant other government services such as healthcare, education, transportation, and even tax collection (depending on the nature of the social contract the sovereign as with their subjects). Ultimately however, the sovereign's legitimacy lies in the ability to protect it's citizens, and enforce law and order. If citizens do not respect this legitimacy of the state, then the sovereign has no public authority within that territory, leaving a vacuum for another type of sovereign (organized crime or a separatist government for example).

The introduction of privatized police forces and the use of militias in weaker states threatens this dynamic for sovereigns in states wrestling with these issues. In states with significant security gaps, often times they are forced to resort to alternative measures to enforce their own security. Take for example the instance of Ukraine, where the conventional military is not sufficiently powerful to handle the separatist insurgency in the East of the country. They are forced to rely on nationalistic militias to tackle this security threat, and these militias are not always loyal to the government, and there have even been instances of armed conflict between the government and these forces (Oliphant). Despite these confrontations, the state still heavily relies on these militias to do much of the fighting in the East of the country, and these militias have gained much local popularity as a result of their efforts. This creates an issue of legitimacy for the state, where it doesn't necessarily have a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence, and calls into question how much sovereignty the state truly has. In summary, states need to worry about how much legitimacy the give to state actors in terms of legitimate use of violence, because it creates issues of sovereignty down the road.


Roland Oliphant, "Far-Right group Pravy Sektor challenges Ukraine government after shootout," The Telegraph, 27 July, 2015. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11734520/Ukrainian-forces-surround-nationalist-militia-following-deadly-attack-in-western-Ukraine.html (accessed on 25 July, 2018)

Who will fill the gaps?

Both the Williams and the Abrahamsen and Williams articles this week emphasized the idea that where gaps exist in the capacity of states to exercise authority, other actors and mechanisms will fill them in.

How is an actor granted authority in the international realm? From what we’ve read this week, ideally it’s the states that would have to grant authority through formalized processes. In the case of industries like privatized security, this may not always be the case. While they have to work within the rules set forth by governments of the states they work in, they ultimately answer to  corporate, private decision-makers. In the case of privatized security at the Koido Holdings diamond mine, for example, distrust of the public police force has driven increased reliance on private security companies and thus “PSCs have stepped into the breach created by the incapacity of the Sierra Leonian State” (Abrahamsen & Williams).  The verdict is still out on whether these entities are any more trustworthy than state provided security forces but it seems the combination of the public and private security actors has allowed at least this diamond mine in Sierra Leone to inch closer to peace of mind.

In the above mentioned case, a private company has moved to fill the void left by state actors but as Williams’ article on transnational organized crime has pointed out, the actors that move to fill the void are not always legalized entities. If private companies can move to fill the void, what’s stopping criminal organizations from doing so? If distrust in the state legitimizes constituents’ reasoning for turning to other actors, they will ultimately turn to someone they trust more than the state. It would seem that the combination of public and private authorities holds more parties accountable. The danger is that this could develop to more accountability expected from one actor over the other. Could arrangements like these end up privatizing the legitimation of violence? If that is the case I would have to agrees with Abrahamsen and Williams that “the role of the state has shifted from rowing towards steering.”

Williams, Phil. "Transnational Organized Crime and the State," in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002).

Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, "Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics," International Political Sociology 3:1 (2009)

Fundamental Change: What a Week

The assignment for week six was definitely and interesting one. Personally, I enjoy debating, and arguing, so it has been a fun week for me. I put in more effort this week, re-reading the assigned articles for the module, and continually checking to see if the "pro group" had posted their rebuttal. When reading their rebuttal, it was almost as if my body had been taken over. I instantly started coming up with arguments to make, and jotting down the specific quotes from their post so that I could reference the precise spots in which they were wrong. After what had only seemed like an hour, I looked up to see that it was approaching 11pm. I had been working for hours. In this post, I am going to talk about how I think the "pro group" did, what point I believe they should have made, and how I think the exercise went overall.

One point that started to drive some of our group members crazy, was the fact that the pro group did not have a basic definition of what they believed fundamental change was, specifically. If I were in their group, I would have made the example of the international environment changing from a bipolar world, to a multipolar world as the point that fundamental change is possible. This argument alone would have made me struggle to oppose the idea that fundamental change is not only possible, but that it already happened in the international environment. The group could have then based all of their arguments on this one point, that it has happened before, and therefore it is possible to happen again.

Overall, I think the exercise, including the class discussion, went well. It was more of each side arguing why they were right, and less trying to convince the other side that their view was wrong. I do not believe that any minds were changed during this activity. During the class discussion, some people got a little testy, including myself, when our personal arguments were under scrutiny. This was a fun exercise, but took more work than our usual interactive group activities. This activity only worked to emphasize my view of humanity, that all humans are just self-interested. That humans will look out for their own security, and believing that this will never change. In conclusion, I guess that I was lucky to be placed in the group that was based on realist theory, as I believe that I am generally a realist when it comes to international relations, even though I did end up agreeing with a Green Bay Packers fan. I guess there is a first for everything.


https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/06/fundamental-change-what-week.html

A realist approach to fundimental change

This debate brought forth some interesting notions regarding fundamental change in the realm of international relations, what it's nature is, and how it can be accomplished. One of the key points discussed was the issue of sovereignty and whether states would be willing to forgo their sovereignty and under which conditions this might happen. The argument is that states will not only forgo their own security, but in a certain regards their own survival in order to join this greater institution or entity. I do believe that if there is some recreation of the sense of self, in terms of role and identity, that this might happen within certain contexts (the creation of a European identity for example). That being said, I do ultimately believe that these cases are the exception more than the rule. Central to the argument made by the pro-fundamental change side was that this change happens within the context of large international institutions (and to a lesser extent created by borderless social and political movements) and that once certain values of these institutions were exported that they would be institutionalized within the new member state. The institutionalization of these new sets of norms and values are then one of the key factors of reshaping a state's identity or role within international society. One of the main problems with this theory is that state's join these institutions for a variety of reasons, and once they join it does not necessarily mean that their value system will change at all, and some actors will use these institutions to advance their own domestic agenda and therefore further entrench the idea of sovereignty. If the issue around fundamental change is centered around the idea that states will surrender their sovereignty in due time as a result of a restructuring of their values system or change in role and identity, then this neglects the role of individuals on the domestic level play and the internal power struggles within a state. Ultimately, the realm of international relations is a collection of states with their own set of individual actors vying for power on the domestic level, and without some external force or threat serving as a catalyst for cooperation, these individual actors are not (as a whole) likely to give up sovereignty which is their vehicle for obtaining power.