Now What?

We've come a long way in this course. I am glad that Hobbes was the foundation on which we built our learning as it provided a good reference point to which we could all look back and say, "Ah yes, that reminds me of man in the state of nature." I enjoyed watching everybody shift from initially deciding that Hobbes was pretty much on the ball to, by the end of the course, embracing completely constructivist or liberal norms. 15 weeks is a long period of learning for such a short amount of time.

The debate in class rounded out this course rather nicely. As we argued over what would be the end of American hegemony I couldn't help but notice everyone finding it almost hard to accept that there was nothing that could be done to prevent it, with some even offering solutions to counter the American fall. As if such a fall cannot happen, or else.

On a practical note, though my group chose GWOT as the major threat to American primacy, it is my estimation that China will be the end of American hegemony. As they advance technologically, economically, institutionally and militarily, it is only a matter of time before we are surpassed or at least weakened to the point of parity. America's decisions, like being unable to settle GWOT or other crises it is inextricably linked to across the globe, will only hasten that fall. As I discussed in my last post, it hurts me, but also brings me hope. Hope that we will live in a world one day where a hegemony is not needed, where borders no longer matter and we are citizens of this world, not of specific countries.

I enjoyed this course very much, it was a strong refresher for things I learned in undergrad, was a rude awakening for the things I did not, and was a good primer for what the MAIR program will be like (this is my first course in the program). If the courses from here on out are as stimulating, this experience will be a worthwhile one.

Week 15, Post-Class

I think my favorite part of this debate was seeing that, in the end, most of our arguments relied on each other. I know there were several times I noticed it in our group’s writing and in our opposing team's arguments. I would read something and think, “you know that could really be turned around to support the opposing argument…” We have spent a lot of time in class talking about the ways America is the biggest threat to America and global cooperation but tonight there was an overwhelming presence of the idea that the downfall of America will be when the world decides they can go on without us.

Whether that means there is a new steward of the international realm such as China, or people no longer can or want to immigrate to the states, or that the world is sick of our war mongering, it seems that one day the US will no longer have the resources or legitimacy to be the hegemonic power. What’s more, in all our arguments we envisioned a transfer of power to another party. Although we didn’t all argue for the same type of power to be transferred – some thought it would be economic power, others security – there was an implication that a weakened America will not lead to the easing of sovereignty and towards a world government but to ad hoc solutions in the areas where the US can no longer lead.

Or maybe this is just an echo of my own opinion. I don’t know that I'm convinced human nature will allow us to put a desire for sovereignty aside and in the need for sovereignty we are persistent in the idea that the sovereignty in others is threatening. Whether out of fear or ambition I think the transfer of power has been and will continue to be the inevitable evolution of the international order. However, the transfer of power may not look the same as it has in the past so we must be ready to adapt. 

Week 15 Post Class

This last class brought many different perspectives into the issue of the downfall of the United States, and aside from the issue of internal polarization (which was OBVIOUSLY the best argument of all...) the greatest threat to US global hegemony arises from China.

The threat posed by China isn't necessarily a military one (although they do flex their muscles on the regional level in the South China Sea), but an economic one. China has been transitioning away from an economy focused on manufacturing towards one based on innovation. Admittedly, the success in this venture has yet to be seen, but growing optimism at the potential of emerging tech scenes in Shenzhen and Beijing has made venture capitialists invest in China's technology at a growing rate. If China was able to foster this economic development, it could seek to challenage the US as the technologic hub of the world.

Historically, China's aspirations have been regional rather than global, but Premier Xi Jinping has more international goals than his predicessors. Unlike the American way of projecting power and asserting dominance, China doesn't expect other countries to adapt their system of governance or way of life (regionally thats a different story, but this is in the global conversation). Rather, they simply expect ownership over critical infrastructure within countries and to have a say in their local politics,  like in Djibouti for example. This affords China the ability to manipulate states without having any moral obligation to favor one state over the other. China's ambitions have shifted to the global arena, and with their view on hegemony they won't have as many moral constraints to hold them back as did the liberal US hegemony.

Downfall of U.S. Hegemonic Power

Our last week of class was an interesting experience. More and more I found that I actually do think the greatest threat to the United States role as a hegemonic power, is ourselves. We have always had some level of isolationist policy, but this has increased in recent years. Specifically, when looking at the past two years under the Trump administration, our policy has been to withdrawal from the global governance structure whenever we disagree with a proposed action or stance. However, it needs to be reiterated to the administration, and its supporters, that if you do not like something, then change it. The only way to effectively change the policy of an organization is by being a respected part of the body. There have been multiple times when I have heard President Trump argue that the direction of an organization or structure is wrong, that’s why we must leave. But this only removes our position as a respected member of the global community, and forces countries to work on solutions without us having a seat at the table.

When looking at other groups arguments, I did find them compelling, even believing that they are a threat to U.S. hegemonic power, but not the biggest threat. Looking at the global war on terror argument, I had a hard time grasping just why the group thought this was the greatest threat. Yes, the United States does spend an enormous amount of money on the GWOT, but I would argue that this places us in front of the eyes of other countries, reiterating our global hegemonic power.

Even with the possible lose of hegemonic power, I do not see this happening in the near future. If we continue on this path, it could definitely happen, just not within the next 5 years.

https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/downfall-of-us-hegemonic-power.html

Week 15-Pre Class

Professor Jackson mentioned in his lectures the various methods of hegemonic transitions and raised the questions of what would be the most likely outcomes, and the most desirable outcomes. Given these are two of the most significant questions looming in the field of international relations and one of the final blog posts, I will provide my own prognosis to the question of what is the most desired outcome based on the material we have covered in class to date.

I believe that the most desirable of the scenario's which Professor Jackson mentioned would be the creation of hegemonic institutions which would create certain boundaries for state actors to operate within. I believe that this the current liberal hegemonic world order which the United States has created and fostered since World War II is the most ideal from the perspective of preserving the fundamental human rights valued by the Western liberal order. Preserving this type of order in some capacity as the dominant order helps maintain unipolarity or at the very least offers a balance to the rising Asian powers, which helps preserves some global balance of powers. The type of liberal world order I suggest is not necessarily led by the United States, which has long been the military and economic might of the Western world, but could be the result of some resurgence in Europe or a revival of the ideals for liberal democracy globally.

The current direction of the world order currently however is that with the decline in strength of the liberal hegemonic world order (note that this is not exclusively the US) appears to favour a more multi-polar world where there is no clear hegemonic power. A multipolar world is tantamount to a Hobbsian state of nature, making an already anarchic global system of interstate relations even less bound to the few rules and norms set in place. A bipolar world at least provides states with clarity of goals and interests, either support one of the global hegemons in China, or the old guard of the liberal hegemonic world order. It is highly unlikely that China will emerge as a great power on the international stage, and historically has preferred to exercise it's great power status in the regional context rather than the global stage, however Chairman Xi Jinping has made known his global ambitions with the One Belt One Road projects and could assert China's power on a more global level.

Ultimately, the most desirable transition of hegemonic power away from the US would see the liberal hegemonic world order preserved in some capacity. The institutions which it has created such as NATO or the IMF would help preserve the legacy of the US's world order, as would a rise of European significance, or the re-emergence of liberal democracy globally. At the very least, an avoidance of creating a multipolar world would be highly undesirable, and should be avoided if possible.

Week 15 pre-class

The Melian Dialogue offers perspective on the issues of realism vs. idealism and what a "just empire" is, and this logical can be used to examine the American situation. The Athenians represent the realist perspective, they believe that the goal of the state is to ensure it's own security, and great powers can only reinforce their security by gaining more power. On the other side of the debate the Melians believed that they are acting from a moral high-ground, and believed that others would act on their behalf and intervene for their cause. The Melians didn't believe that the Athenians were just in their actions, however the Athenians affirmed that they had defended the Greek civilization from the Persians and that any course of action they take to protect their empire (which they saw incorporating Melos as doing) would make that a just action. This begs the question for great powers, does the end justify the means for the self-preservation of hegemony? And what is the morality that guides hegemons?

In the American case, morality has served as the justification for the expansion of American influence abroad, specifically regarding the ideals of Western democracy, however this is simply a thinly veiled guise. We can see this specifically framed within the context of the countries of Ukraine and Georgia and their goals of NATO membership. The US was willing to support their cause in terms of funding and logistics when these countries were in the process of leaving the Russian sphere of influence, however with the threat of Russian military aggression the US hasn't provided anything more than nominal support for the Ukrainian and Georgian causes. We can see American expansionism behind the guise of morality in the case of the Iraq War as well, with the US invading on the grounds of liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless regime and combatting global terror. Ultimately what the US ended up pursuing was simply expanding influence in the regime by way of regime change. In the end, the timeless words of Thusydides ring true when it comes to great powers, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."