End of Hegemony, Beginning of the World

This topic is always a difficult one for me to face whenever it has come up in my studies of political science. Indeed as a military member it is one that weighs on me every day. I was born within the borders of the most powerful nation on the planet, riding high having just vanquished the Soviet Union, untouchable by any power. My country has acted with a free hand, sometimes with the most benevolent of intentions, sometimes not, for most of my life. Regardless of American missteps, however, I have never lost faith in American exceptionalism or in American stewardship of the international system. It is for that reason that the inevitable end of American hegemony pains me.

History has taught us that no empire lasts forever, with no exception. American hegemony will end, but when and how? Professor Jackson's lecture focused on hegemony, forecasting, and transitions of power. It also gets my brain going, wondering just how all of this will play out. Given a resurgent China, a war-weary America, and a resurgent Russia, how will the transition from American hegemony play out? I maintain that we are moving to a multipolar world with a handful of great powers helping maintain a system of lesser powers. I also maintain that this is the best outcome for my personal end goal for the world: the human project.

An end to hegemony will lead to Bremmer's G-Zero world, a scenario where a lack of global leadership means either greater cooperation or its opposite; he posits that we are already there, but I would say that American/Western leadership are still quite strong. I think that in this multipolar, G-Zero situation we'd see initial conflicts, some of which we have already seen brewing with Russia's resurgence and more adventurous Saudi and Israeli interventions. Watch for more as American hegemony wanes. Once we have settled in this new multipolar system I foresee a split to greater regional cooperation, as smaller states break for stronger regional guarantors of security and economic prosperity. Following this stage I think we will see greater global cooperation among these regions, with an eventual leap to a true world government.

Week 14 Pre-Class

Constitutional movements, as defined in the lectures by Professor Jackson, are intended to provide informal sets of rules and boundaries for great and middle powers. These constitutions, treaties, or agreements are intended to instate some balance of powers after a significant war or shift in power balance. More often than not, they seek to reinstate the previous hegemonic order in some capacity and reinforce the strength of great powers which emerged after the power flux. These types of agreements are bound to fail in the long term however, as they seek to recapture a picture in time (so to speak) and are unable to account to the dynamic nature of power relationships in the realm of the international.

Two notable examples of how constitutional movements fail to stand the test of time are the Congress of Vienna and the Yalta Conference. The purpose of the Congress of Vienna was to reestablish the previous monarchical order in Europe and redistribute land and power to avoid another significant war in Europe following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Ultimately however, nationalism and the rise in democratic ideologies brought forth civil wars and turmoil which the Congress sought to curtail. The Yalta Conference sought to reinstate order in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, with the U.S. and Soviet Union rising as great powers after the collapse of Germany. The treaty's purpose was to carve sphere's of influence in Europe between Western influence and the influence of the Soviet Union, as to avoid any future conflict in the region. Despite these efforts however, the Cold War still occurred and the struggle for dominance in Europe (and elsewhere) was unaffected by this attempt at peace.

Constitutional movements are intended to create order out of chaos and entrench the powers which arise out of a conflict. These movements are unable to stand the test of time though, as they do not account for the many factors which affect the realm of the international (social movements, clashes of personalities, and economic movements for example). As such, they capture a snapshot in time, but cannot survive in the dynamic nature that is the international.

Week 14 pre-class

I’m torn between the likelihood of a hegemonic future with the US at the center and a push towards a constitutional moment. Historically we’ve seen constitutional moments come out of global crises or world wars, but I think many of the ideas and social movements that have been previously discussed in class could push the international realm closer to a constitutional moment which isn’t fraught with conflict and disaster. Maybe the “human project” scenario isn’t likely in the near future but, as professor Jackson said, maybe our prediction odds are better if we just flip a coin!

I found John Ikenberry’s points on the US possessing several elements of a hegemonic power rather convincing, although I wouldn’t go so far as to call it an empire just yet. Mostly because the sustainability of hegemony, after coercive power, seems to rely on the benefits provided by the hegemon to those at different levels along the hierarchical chain. In that case one of the worst things the US could do would be to make other states lose sight of the benefits the US offers in the international realm and our current administration seems to have a knack for making long standing partners and beneficiaries doubt their relationship with the US. Essentially, the US, under the guise of picking up new relationships, could struggle to maintain the old.

Another point that stood out to me from Ikenberry’s text was that hegemon will create institution to facilitate multilateral relationships but will ultimately be the central sovereign figure. The US has, in most instances, helped create multilateral institutions on a global scale and then taken those over as that eight-ton gorilla in the room. Of course, in organizations such as the UN the force of the UN can still be put down but it is unlikely to be done by any state wishing to maintain a benefit of sorts through their relationship with the US.

Forever Wishing for the Human Project

At the end of the end of the asynchronous lecture, Professor Jackson asked which future trajectory was most likely or least likely of the power dynamics between countries. Although it is my favored prediction, the least likely future scenario in power transition is the human project. Out of the three scenarios, the one that appears to be the complete opposite of the human project, hegemonic institutions, appears the most likely.

I think for the most part, people would love for everyone to agree on something collectively as the human race. However, this is very unlikely as there remains a difference in opinion on large-scale issues, and whether or not they are even issues. An example of this is the different opinions on climate change. Although most countries believe that it is a global issue that must be worked on, there are countries that do not believe in working to end climate change with other global leaders, such as the United States. The Paris Climate Agreement is a prime example of a transition to the human project. Leaders from around the world got together to create goals they agreed to try to meet, in hopes of focusing on more renewable energy and limiting current pollution. This idea appeared to be working, humanity agreeing together to stop the destruction of our planet. That is until the idea of President Trump became a reality. Instead of agreeing to continue to do our best to help the planet, Trump decided to pull the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement.

I think that this illustrates that the hegemonic institutions scenario is the most likely, at least as long as Trump is president. On the other hand, to be fair, I don't think all of the blame for an unlikely "human project" falls on Trump. I believe that there will always be someone or some country in great power that relies on and enjoys using dominant power. As much as we would like to think that we could all work together for the greater good, there will always be someone that thinks they are strong enough to do things on their own, or who refuses to give up some of their power for a collective action. This all goes back to Hobbes' state of nature, humans are and always will be self-interested.


https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/forever-wishing-for-human-project.html

week 14 pre class

       This week’s readings have a myriad methods for analyzing power in a very traditional sense. Power as seen through the lens of military spending and GDP. I think that these traditional metrics leave a lot to be desired and are fundamentally changing. I have asserted in other writings that technology is adjusting the fabric of international relations and leading to changes requiring a major shift in the method of analysis.

       Linear relationships are often noted and the sum of power is a simple 2 part balance, Giddens, Mann, and Wallerstein note, “It is normally true that if a Power's resource base increases then its military power and geopolitical pretensions will also” pg 334. Economic power is harder to define with increased globalization. If we add military alliances into the mix these are also more muddied and difficult to separate as globalization often pulls most countries loyalty in opposing directions with increased economic integration and ideological conflict. Additionally how we define economic power is increasingly changing. The world is increasingly cyber based with assets like bitcoin residing completely on the internet. This is also adding a completely different metric to military power with the ability to steal massive amounts of information VIA the web as evident in Chinese and North Korean attacks in recent years. The playing field has been fundamentally altered shifting the power balance but the even more terrifying fact is that at this time we might not even fully understand what power will mean in the new era.

     It is clear though that the major world powers have adjusted their way of projecting power. The tightest control was always an official imperial empire. This method though is incredibly costly. In an official imperial status the country in charge has a responsibility to provide significant financial support and government services to solidify their legitimacy. If anything is happening negatively in a subbordinate country this leaves significant vulnerability, It is simply too difficult to maintain financial and moral superiority. There has obviously been a shift to hegemony with institutions like the U.N. that the U.S. can assert legitimate power. Power is exerted in different manners as well as having different metrics.

“Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” British Journal of Sociology 40:2 (1989).

John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,” Review of International Studies 30:4 (2004)