Public Authority and the International System

This module was particularly interesting to me in that it covered questions and concepts that deal with the idea of an end to the current framework of the international system. As the system continues to integrate further and states become more and more interdependent, the idea of single, unitary actors becomes increasingly more difficult to defend. International law is one such method of integration that begs the question, can the impermeable, autonomous states of yesterday make it through today and into tomorrow?

The part of Professor Jackson's lecture that I love the most is where he talks about how difficult it is for the idea of public authority to exist in the upper left box of the 2x2. As there is no sovereign in the international system yet, states acting as both public and authority is such an interesting concept. It is one of the stronger arguments for the increasing permeability and loosening of autonomy going on in the system. Sovereigns choosing to bind themselves and be accountable to authority from without, granted authority enforced by other states. It raises more questions for me. If sovereigns are willing to forfeit autonomy to others for the sake of international law, is it unreasonable to assume that they could, down the line, cede it to a sovereign to maintain such law? Would a sovereign not be more impartial than a series of other states with divergent interests? By extension, would the application of violence by a sovereign not be more impartial, too?

Week 8 Post Class

After reflecting on the material from class the previous two weeks, I started to wonder what the role legitimacy has in when examining transnational criminal organizations. Professor Jackson provides the definition for authority as simply "the right to do something" and while we haven't defined legitimacy in class, it can be best summarized as the acceptance of authority. Essentially, legitimacy is the mandate of the people and provides democratic support to authority. An actor or entity can have authority without legitimacy, this is often the case in autocracies, however their hold on power is less stable without legitimacy.

When examining transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and whether they can supplant the state as the main authority within a given territory, their legitimacy has a huge influence on their overall ability to maintain authority. When TCOs are the predominant authority in an area it is mostly due to some capacity gap of the state which is unable to either provide some kind of service or enforce it. More often than not, when TCOs are the predominant authority in an area they acquire their authority through the use of coercion and physical violence. Whatever authority they have is therefore based on their ability to maintain their capabilities of coercion in order to remain as the authority, because when confronted with a viable alternative authority will be granted to the actor with both capabilities to enforce laws, as well as with the legitimacy granted by the people. Without legitimacy therefore, TCOs don't have any real staying power as an authority.

International Law and the Collapse of Sovereignty

After watching the lecture for this module, one question posed by Professor Jackson stuck with me: can international law be strengthened without doing away with state sovereignty? My answer to this question is a realist response, that state sovereignty cannot exist with the expansion of international law. The mere state of being a member of an international organization with a judicial branch implies that the state is no longer sovereign, no longer having unconditional authority over it's actions. 

The reason for this is fairly simple, by allocating more authority to a body that dictates international law, the state loses a portion of its authority, and a state cannot be autonomous without the monopoly on authority. An important point to note here, is that sovereign states can enforce international law. However, once this is done, autonomy is eradicated. According to Professor Jackson, the superior legal authority within international law, means that states in the international system are no longer fully autonomous. By giving authority to an international body which governs international law, the state is no longer sovereign, and no longer has full autonomy.

To aid in comprehending this idea, let's look at a body that governs international law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ, was created as a means to solve legal disputes between member states. By submitting to the Court's jurisdiction, states relinquish a piece of their sovereignty. The state would no longer be autonomous, no longer having all authority to govern itself. The reason for this being that if the state was brought before the Court in a dispute, the state must then adhere to the ruling of the Court, losing authority over that specific matter. Therefore, if a state wishes to remain sovereign, it should abstain from the realm of global governance.

Some people may argue against this idea, claiming that in reality there is a grey area where states can retain sovereignty while international law is strengthened. However, this issue is black and white, either states are sovereign, or they are not. There is simply no middle ground on which to hide from the reality of the international system.


https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/06/international-law-and-collapse-of.html

Week 8 Post Class

Recently the United States has made overtures at recognizing Israel's claim to the Golan Heights. This is significant in that this would be the first time since the end of World War II where the United States would recognize a territory captured by military means. This recognition could potentially set in place a precedent which could grant other states the public authority to recognize other territories captured by military means in the future. Since there is no superior legal authority within the realm of the international, public authority is dictated by precedent, and the willingness of states to follow through with said precedent. This particular precedent bears the threat of a belligerent sovereign using the threat of violence on a smaller state in order to expand their territorial claims inside the smaller state, and then having these territorial claims be recognized by the allies of the belligerent sovereign. Any attempt by other states to disavow this claim to the belligerent's new territoriality would be nominal, as any military action within these new borders can be interpreted by states which recognize this new border as a violation of sovereignty.

A similiar situation occurred after the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state in 2008. Kosovo's territory was located within the sovereign country of Serbia, and (to summarize a complex series of negotions) declared independence in 2008 without the consent of Serbia. Kosovo was promptly recognized by a number of states including the U.S. shortly after declaring itself independent. This set a negative precedent that regional separatist movements do not require any public authority from the sovereign country they are declaring independence from. This precedent was then used by Russia in the Georgian autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to justify military intervention in Georgia to protect the sovereignty of these two regions. One of the main differences between the Golan Heights recognition and the recognition of Kosovo would be that only the U.S. would recognize the Golan Heights and Kosovo received recognition from a broader international audience, however the threat of establishing this precedent still remains and should be taken very seriously.

Limits to the control of violence

I thought this weeks topic was an interesting examination of the question of statehood in the face of the growing presence of transnational organizations and international systems of law.

In theory, states should place the limits to the control of violence as the highest priority on their list. Without the "monopoly on the legitimate use of violence," state sovereigns cede authority, and if they are replaced as the legitimate source of the use of violence then they ultimately forfeit their sovereignty. Privatization may supplant other government services such as healthcare, education, transportation, and even tax collection (depending on the nature of the social contract the sovereign as with their subjects). Ultimately however, the sovereign's legitimacy lies in the ability to protect it's citizens, and enforce law and order. If citizens do not respect this legitimacy of the state, then the sovereign has no public authority within that territory, leaving a vacuum for another type of sovereign (organized crime or a separatist government for example).

The introduction of privatized police forces and the use of militias in weaker states threatens this dynamic for sovereigns in states wrestling with these issues. In states with significant security gaps, often times they are forced to resort to alternative measures to enforce their own security. Take for example the instance of Ukraine, where the conventional military is not sufficiently powerful to handle the separatist insurgency in the East of the country. They are forced to rely on nationalistic militias to tackle this security threat, and these militias are not always loyal to the government, and there have even been instances of armed conflict between the government and these forces (Oliphant). Despite these confrontations, the state still heavily relies on these militias to do much of the fighting in the East of the country, and these militias have gained much local popularity as a result of their efforts. This creates an issue of legitimacy for the state, where it doesn't necessarily have a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence, and calls into question how much sovereignty the state truly has. In summary, states need to worry about how much legitimacy the give to state actors in terms of legitimate use of violence, because it creates issues of sovereignty down the road.


Roland Oliphant, "Far-Right group Pravy Sektor challenges Ukraine government after shootout," The Telegraph, 27 July, 2015. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11734520/Ukrainian-forces-surround-nationalist-militia-following-deadly-attack-in-western-Ukraine.html (accessed on 25 July, 2018)

Who will fill the gaps?

Both the Williams and the Abrahamsen and Williams articles this week emphasized the idea that where gaps exist in the capacity of states to exercise authority, other actors and mechanisms will fill them in.

How is an actor granted authority in the international realm? From what we’ve read this week, ideally it’s the states that would have to grant authority through formalized processes. In the case of industries like privatized security, this may not always be the case. While they have to work within the rules set forth by governments of the states they work in, they ultimately answer to  corporate, private decision-makers. In the case of privatized security at the Koido Holdings diamond mine, for example, distrust of the public police force has driven increased reliance on private security companies and thus “PSCs have stepped into the breach created by the incapacity of the Sierra Leonian State” (Abrahamsen & Williams).  The verdict is still out on whether these entities are any more trustworthy than state provided security forces but it seems the combination of the public and private security actors has allowed at least this diamond mine in Sierra Leone to inch closer to peace of mind.

In the above mentioned case, a private company has moved to fill the void left by state actors but as Williams’ article on transnational organized crime has pointed out, the actors that move to fill the void are not always legalized entities. If private companies can move to fill the void, what’s stopping criminal organizations from doing so? If distrust in the state legitimizes constituents’ reasoning for turning to other actors, they will ultimately turn to someone they trust more than the state. It would seem that the combination of public and private authorities holds more parties accountable. The danger is that this could develop to more accountability expected from one actor over the other. Could arrangements like these end up privatizing the legitimation of violence? If that is the case I would have to agrees with Abrahamsen and Williams that “the role of the state has shifted from rowing towards steering.”

Williams, Phil. "Transnational Organized Crime and the State," in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002).

Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, "Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics," International Political Sociology 3:1 (2009)