I think the readings this week hit home for me as a veteran of military service as well as a family member of a police officer. I cannot avoid a sort of immediate emotional response to privatizing something that is the backbone of much of my life. Certainly we saw the drawbacks of privatized military forces operating such a Blackwater. They were allowed to accept risks and were not accountable to anyone. Ultimately they ended up hurting our military effort through reprisals as the result of their abuse. conversely we can look at what is going on today within the police departments with unnecessary deaths and copious videos of police brutality. We know that cops are under trained and under payed for the dangerous work they do. It is no secret that the private sector generally advances faster and has more resources available than the government sector. Certainly privatized security contractors have significantly more training as well as better resources than most of our military or even our police Officers. Private security firms provide customers with extensive video surveillance and high end technology. So this leads me to be concerned over further disadvantaging impoverished groups.
If countries increasingly privatize policing and basically create a scenario where each community is responsible for choosing government or private, won't this lead to poor communities receiving inferior support?
I think they way that Africa has managed to combine private and government into one command can help solve the issue of unity of command and ensuring that everyone received equal services.
Rita Abramson and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3:1 (2009).
Group Blog for Prof. Shirk's International Studies: History, Theory, and Practice Class, May 2018
week 15 post class
I found this Modules readings very interesting. What leads to a great power rising or falling? There were many great theories proposed in the “Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” usually they concern over extending an empire. We analyzed the balance of power in our class discussions on america's greatest threats. We spent time analyzing the hard numbers and debated military might and transitions based on economic power and technological advancements. I think it is easy to analyze compare and try to crunch numbers but I think they miss something essential. We don't know how to truly define the tipping point. There is no equation that says at GDP - National debt + foreign wars X 15% equates to a failure or fundamental shift in a nation's power. There is no numbers that can show why the enlightenment was so successful, there is no way to predict the genius of Galileo. There is a very strong intangible in all of history. The human will or spirit does play a powerful role in shaping the strength of a nation. I think when we simply analyze the hard data we miss powerful forces that can help us explain this shift. Carl Jung theorized the collective unconcious to define undercurrents that shape humanity and create a shared backbone. I think when we discussed symbolic technologies in module we found a way in which these ideas weave their way into cultural influence and evolve. These forces are the true tipping factor. if we look at the fall of Rome it was surely over expanded but it was also corrupt. It was a Nation over indulgent in sport and hell bent on lavish parties and under educating it's citizens. The national spirit had erroded and no one was capable of saving it. There were certainly points where the people in power could have stepped aside or decided to invest in their country but they were more concerned with wealth. The true maker of breaker of a nation is the moral will of the people.
- “Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” British Journal of Sociology 40:2 (1989).
- Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” Review of International Studies 35:1 (2009)
Corporations: Political or Economic Actors
Are corporations political or economic actors
It's an important question to ask when thinking about the interaction of corporations, private actors, and states or organizations, public actors. Professor Jackson talks about this interaction, but here is a piece that in my mind needs addressing that I think is missing in the readings and the lecture about corporations: their inherently political nature.
Corporations exist almost solely for the purpose acquiring money. This point cannot be argued. What I feel is overlooked, however, is the means by which corporations, contending with political actors on an international scale, go about achieving their ends. Some would argue that corporations are primarily economic actors and I cannot stress enough how incorrect that assertion is. When corporations grow beyond the borders of a single state they inherently become political. In order to continue maximizing profits in the international realm inherently means acquiring political power. Corporations simply cannot conduct operations without interacting with political bodies. Therefore it is by necessity that these corporations are not just economic actors, but also political actors.
This is an important point to underscore especially when discussing the accountability of corporations vs states. Corporations are less constrained than many states because they are not accountable to anyone but their shareholders and the law. As long as corporations don't carry out heinous breaches of human rights or break international laws, shareholders are more than content if the money flows in. Because they are unconstrained and can essentially go where states cannot, coporations should be considered very potent political actors, as well.
It's an important question to ask when thinking about the interaction of corporations, private actors, and states or organizations, public actors. Professor Jackson talks about this interaction, but here is a piece that in my mind needs addressing that I think is missing in the readings and the lecture about corporations: their inherently political nature.
Corporations exist almost solely for the purpose acquiring money. This point cannot be argued. What I feel is overlooked, however, is the means by which corporations, contending with political actors on an international scale, go about achieving their ends. Some would argue that corporations are primarily economic actors and I cannot stress enough how incorrect that assertion is. When corporations grow beyond the borders of a single state they inherently become political. In order to continue maximizing profits in the international realm inherently means acquiring political power. Corporations simply cannot conduct operations without interacting with political bodies. Therefore it is by necessity that these corporations are not just economic actors, but also political actors.
This is an important point to underscore especially when discussing the accountability of corporations vs states. Corporations are less constrained than many states because they are not accountable to anyone but their shareholders and the law. As long as corporations don't carry out heinous breaches of human rights or break international laws, shareholders are more than content if the money flows in. Because they are unconstrained and can essentially go where states cannot, coporations should be considered very potent political actors, as well.
Week 15 Post Class
This last class brought many different perspectives into the issue of the downfall of the United States, and aside from the issue of internal polarization (which was OBVIOUSLY the best argument of all...) the greatest threat to US global hegemony arises from China.
The threat posed by China isn't necessarily a military one (although they do flex their muscles on the regional level in the South China Sea), but an economic one. China has been transitioning away from an economy focused on manufacturing towards one based on innovation. Admittedly, the success in this venture has yet to be seen, but growing optimism at the potential of emerging tech scenes in Shenzhen and Beijing has made venture capitialists invest in China's technology at a growing rate. If China was able to foster this economic development, it could seek to challenage the US as the technologic hub of the world.
Historically, China's aspirations have been regional rather than global, but Premier Xi Jinping has more international goals than his predicessors. Unlike the American way of projecting power and asserting dominance, China doesn't expect other countries to adapt their system of governance or way of life (regionally thats a different story, but this is in the global conversation). Rather, they simply expect ownership over critical infrastructure within countries and to have a say in their local politics, like in Djibouti for example. This affords China the ability to manipulate states without having any moral obligation to favor one state over the other. China's ambitions have shifted to the global arena, and with their view on hegemony they won't have as many moral constraints to hold them back as did the liberal US hegemony.
The threat posed by China isn't necessarily a military one (although they do flex their muscles on the regional level in the South China Sea), but an economic one. China has been transitioning away from an economy focused on manufacturing towards one based on innovation. Admittedly, the success in this venture has yet to be seen, but growing optimism at the potential of emerging tech scenes in Shenzhen and Beijing has made venture capitialists invest in China's technology at a growing rate. If China was able to foster this economic development, it could seek to challenage the US as the technologic hub of the world.
Historically, China's aspirations have been regional rather than global, but Premier Xi Jinping has more international goals than his predicessors. Unlike the American way of projecting power and asserting dominance, China doesn't expect other countries to adapt their system of governance or way of life (regionally thats a different story, but this is in the global conversation). Rather, they simply expect ownership over critical infrastructure within countries and to have a say in their local politics, like in Djibouti for example. This affords China the ability to manipulate states without having any moral obligation to favor one state over the other. China's ambitions have shifted to the global arena, and with their view on hegemony they won't have as many moral constraints to hold them back as did the liberal US hegemony.
Downfall of U.S. Hegemonic Power
Our last week of class was an interesting experience. More
and more I found that I actually do think the greatest threat to the United
States role as a hegemonic power, is ourselves. We have always had some level
of isolationist policy, but this has increased in recent years. Specifically,
when looking at the past two years under the Trump administration, our policy
has been to withdrawal from the global governance structure whenever we
disagree with a proposed action or stance. However, it needs to be reiterated
to the administration, and its supporters, that if you do not like something,
then change it. The only way to effectively change the policy of an
organization is by being a respected part of the body. There have been multiple
times when I have heard President Trump argue that the direction of an
organization or structure is wrong, that’s why we must leave. But this only
removes our position as a respected member of the global community, and forces
countries to work on solutions without us having a seat at the table.
When looking at other groups arguments, I did find them compelling, even believing that they are a threat to U.S. hegemonic power, but not the biggest threat. Looking at the global war on terror argument, I had a hard time grasping just why the group thought this was the greatest threat. Yes, the United States does spend an enormous amount of money on the GWOT, but I would argue that this places us in front of the eyes of other countries, reiterating our global hegemonic power.
Even with the possible lose of hegemonic power, I do not see this happening in the near future. If we continue on this path, it could definitely happen, just not within the next 5 years.
https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/downfall-of-us-hegemonic-power.html
When looking at other groups arguments, I did find them compelling, even believing that they are a threat to U.S. hegemonic power, but not the biggest threat. Looking at the global war on terror argument, I had a hard time grasping just why the group thought this was the greatest threat. Yes, the United States does spend an enormous amount of money on the GWOT, but I would argue that this places us in front of the eyes of other countries, reiterating our global hegemonic power.
Even with the possible lose of hegemonic power, I do not see this happening in the near future. If we continue on this path, it could definitely happen, just not within the next 5 years.
https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/downfall-of-us-hegemonic-power.html
Week 15-Pre Class
Professor Jackson mentioned in his lectures the various methods of hegemonic transitions and raised the questions of what would be the most likely outcomes, and the most desirable outcomes. Given these are two of the most significant questions looming in the field of international relations and one of the final blog posts, I will provide my own prognosis to the question of what is the most desired outcome based on the material we have covered in class to date.
I believe that the most desirable of the scenario's which Professor Jackson mentioned would be the creation of hegemonic institutions which would create certain boundaries for state actors to operate within. I believe that this the current liberal hegemonic world order which the United States has created and fostered since World War II is the most ideal from the perspective of preserving the fundamental human rights valued by the Western liberal order. Preserving this type of order in some capacity as the dominant order helps maintain unipolarity or at the very least offers a balance to the rising Asian powers, which helps preserves some global balance of powers. The type of liberal world order I suggest is not necessarily led by the United States, which has long been the military and economic might of the Western world, but could be the result of some resurgence in Europe or a revival of the ideals for liberal democracy globally.
The current direction of the world order currently however is that with the decline in strength of the liberal hegemonic world order (note that this is not exclusively the US) appears to favour a more multi-polar world where there is no clear hegemonic power. A multipolar world is tantamount to a Hobbsian state of nature, making an already anarchic global system of interstate relations even less bound to the few rules and norms set in place. A bipolar world at least provides states with clarity of goals and interests, either support one of the global hegemons in China, or the old guard of the liberal hegemonic world order. It is highly unlikely that China will emerge as a great power on the international stage, and historically has preferred to exercise it's great power status in the regional context rather than the global stage, however Chairman Xi Jinping has made known his global ambitions with the One Belt One Road projects and could assert China's power on a more global level.
Ultimately, the most desirable transition of hegemonic power away from the US would see the liberal hegemonic world order preserved in some capacity. The institutions which it has created such as NATO or the IMF would help preserve the legacy of the US's world order, as would a rise of European significance, or the re-emergence of liberal democracy globally. At the very least, an avoidance of creating a multipolar world would be highly undesirable, and should be avoided if possible.
I believe that the most desirable of the scenario's which Professor Jackson mentioned would be the creation of hegemonic institutions which would create certain boundaries for state actors to operate within. I believe that this the current liberal hegemonic world order which the United States has created and fostered since World War II is the most ideal from the perspective of preserving the fundamental human rights valued by the Western liberal order. Preserving this type of order in some capacity as the dominant order helps maintain unipolarity or at the very least offers a balance to the rising Asian powers, which helps preserves some global balance of powers. The type of liberal world order I suggest is not necessarily led by the United States, which has long been the military and economic might of the Western world, but could be the result of some resurgence in Europe or a revival of the ideals for liberal democracy globally.
The current direction of the world order currently however is that with the decline in strength of the liberal hegemonic world order (note that this is not exclusively the US) appears to favour a more multi-polar world where there is no clear hegemonic power. A multipolar world is tantamount to a Hobbsian state of nature, making an already anarchic global system of interstate relations even less bound to the few rules and norms set in place. A bipolar world at least provides states with clarity of goals and interests, either support one of the global hegemons in China, or the old guard of the liberal hegemonic world order. It is highly unlikely that China will emerge as a great power on the international stage, and historically has preferred to exercise it's great power status in the regional context rather than the global stage, however Chairman Xi Jinping has made known his global ambitions with the One Belt One Road projects and could assert China's power on a more global level.
Ultimately, the most desirable transition of hegemonic power away from the US would see the liberal hegemonic world order preserved in some capacity. The institutions which it has created such as NATO or the IMF would help preserve the legacy of the US's world order, as would a rise of European significance, or the re-emergence of liberal democracy globally. At the very least, an avoidance of creating a multipolar world would be highly undesirable, and should be avoided if possible.
Week 15 pre-class
The Melian Dialogue offers perspective on the issues of realism vs. idealism and what a "just empire" is, and this logical can be used to examine the American situation. The Athenians represent the realist perspective, they believe that the goal of the state is to ensure it's own security, and great powers can only reinforce their security by gaining more power. On the other side of the debate the Melians believed that they are acting from a moral high-ground, and believed that others would act on their behalf and intervene for their cause. The Melians didn't believe that the Athenians were just in their actions, however the Athenians affirmed that they had defended the Greek civilization from the Persians and that any course of action they take to protect their empire (which they saw incorporating Melos as doing) would make that a just action. This begs the question for great powers, does the end justify the means for the self-preservation of hegemony? And what is the morality that guides hegemons?
In the American case, morality has served as the justification for the expansion of American influence abroad, specifically regarding the ideals of Western democracy, however this is simply a thinly veiled guise. We can see this specifically framed within the context of the countries of Ukraine and Georgia and their goals of NATO membership. The US was willing to support their cause in terms of funding and logistics when these countries were in the process of leaving the Russian sphere of influence, however with the threat of Russian military aggression the US hasn't provided anything more than nominal support for the Ukrainian and Georgian causes. We can see American expansionism behind the guise of morality in the case of the Iraq War as well, with the US invading on the grounds of liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless regime and combatting global terror. Ultimately what the US ended up pursuing was simply expanding influence in the regime by way of regime change. In the end, the timeless words of Thusydides ring true when it comes to great powers, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."
In the American case, morality has served as the justification for the expansion of American influence abroad, specifically regarding the ideals of Western democracy, however this is simply a thinly veiled guise. We can see this specifically framed within the context of the countries of Ukraine and Georgia and their goals of NATO membership. The US was willing to support their cause in terms of funding and logistics when these countries were in the process of leaving the Russian sphere of influence, however with the threat of Russian military aggression the US hasn't provided anything more than nominal support for the Ukrainian and Georgian causes. We can see American expansionism behind the guise of morality in the case of the Iraq War as well, with the US invading on the grounds of liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless regime and combatting global terror. Ultimately what the US ended up pursuing was simply expanding influence in the regime by way of regime change. In the end, the timeless words of Thusydides ring true when it comes to great powers, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."
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