The Rise of the PMC, End of the State

I could not help myself from linking everything private security/military related in the readings to things I have read in fictional literature. It made me wonder if the writers of the novels I read were actually students of international relations. I digress.

Abrahamsen and Williams brought up some really interesting points that I wanted to hone non. They really captured the scale of the growth of private security. The fact that private security outnumbers police forces by 2:1 in the UK, 3:1 in the US, and the entire military is outnumbered in India speaks volumes about how different the system has become. Their argument, that security is increasingly beyond the state, has resonated with me. I don't think it's as doom and gloom as they predict, that those states that have delegated the "monopoly" on violence have contributed to their own demise. I think that is very true for weaker states where private military and security companies continue to grow stronger day to day,  but I don't think it means the end of states.

There's a Tom Clancy novel (not written by him, but in his name) called HAWX and it covers a topic very much like this. The gist of it is that in the near future most governments contract most of their military and security needs out to private companies. Eventually the interests of those companies diverge from those of the state and the novel climaxes with one of the largest PMCs almost successfully staging a coup against the government of the United States (thankfully stopped by some scrappy former F-16 pilots). What I enjoyed about the book and why I find it so interesting in the context of these readings is that as states delegate more and more of their authority it leads me to question: what happens when private companies, with their own interests, decide that they are in charge? It seems farfetched that a private company could ever usurp challenge the United States, but smaller, weaker states? Failed or failing states? What happens if a PMC becomes the "legitimate" owner of a state? I don't see it as likely, but I definitely see it as possible.

Public Authority and the International System

This module was particularly interesting to me in that it covered questions and concepts that deal with the idea of an end to the current framework of the international system. As the system continues to integrate further and states become more and more interdependent, the idea of single, unitary actors becomes increasingly more difficult to defend. International law is one such method of integration that begs the question, can the impermeable, autonomous states of yesterday make it through today and into tomorrow?

The part of Professor Jackson's lecture that I love the most is where he talks about how difficult it is for the idea of public authority to exist in the upper left box of the 2x2. As there is no sovereign in the international system yet, states acting as both public and authority is such an interesting concept. It is one of the stronger arguments for the increasing permeability and loosening of autonomy going on in the system. Sovereigns choosing to bind themselves and be accountable to authority from without, granted authority enforced by other states. It raises more questions for me. If sovereigns are willing to forfeit autonomy to others for the sake of international law, is it unreasonable to assume that they could, down the line, cede it to a sovereign to maintain such law? Would a sovereign not be more impartial than a series of other states with divergent interests? By extension, would the application of violence by a sovereign not be more impartial, too?

Week 14 Pre-Class

Constitutional movements, as defined in the lectures by Professor Jackson, are intended to provide informal sets of rules and boundaries for great and middle powers. These constitutions, treaties, or agreements are intended to instate some balance of powers after a significant war or shift in power balance. More often than not, they seek to reinstate the previous hegemonic order in some capacity and reinforce the strength of great powers which emerged after the power flux. These types of agreements are bound to fail in the long term however, as they seek to recapture a picture in time (so to speak) and are unable to account to the dynamic nature of power relationships in the realm of the international.

Two notable examples of how constitutional movements fail to stand the test of time are the Congress of Vienna and the Yalta Conference. The purpose of the Congress of Vienna was to reestablish the previous monarchical order in Europe and redistribute land and power to avoid another significant war in Europe following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Ultimately however, nationalism and the rise in democratic ideologies brought forth civil wars and turmoil which the Congress sought to curtail. The Yalta Conference sought to reinstate order in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, with the U.S. and Soviet Union rising as great powers after the collapse of Germany. The treaty's purpose was to carve sphere's of influence in Europe between Western influence and the influence of the Soviet Union, as to avoid any future conflict in the region. Despite these efforts however, the Cold War still occurred and the struggle for dominance in Europe (and elsewhere) was unaffected by this attempt at peace.

Constitutional movements are intended to create order out of chaos and entrench the powers which arise out of a conflict. These movements are unable to stand the test of time though, as they do not account for the many factors which affect the realm of the international (social movements, clashes of personalities, and economic movements for example). As such, they capture a snapshot in time, but cannot survive in the dynamic nature that is the international.

Week 14 pre-class

I’m torn between the likelihood of a hegemonic future with the US at the center and a push towards a constitutional moment. Historically we’ve seen constitutional moments come out of global crises or world wars, but I think many of the ideas and social movements that have been previously discussed in class could push the international realm closer to a constitutional moment which isn’t fraught with conflict and disaster. Maybe the “human project” scenario isn’t likely in the near future but, as professor Jackson said, maybe our prediction odds are better if we just flip a coin!

I found John Ikenberry’s points on the US possessing several elements of a hegemonic power rather convincing, although I wouldn’t go so far as to call it an empire just yet. Mostly because the sustainability of hegemony, after coercive power, seems to rely on the benefits provided by the hegemon to those at different levels along the hierarchical chain. In that case one of the worst things the US could do would be to make other states lose sight of the benefits the US offers in the international realm and our current administration seems to have a knack for making long standing partners and beneficiaries doubt their relationship with the US. Essentially, the US, under the guise of picking up new relationships, could struggle to maintain the old.

Another point that stood out to me from Ikenberry’s text was that hegemon will create institution to facilitate multilateral relationships but will ultimately be the central sovereign figure. The US has, in most instances, helped create multilateral institutions on a global scale and then taken those over as that eight-ton gorilla in the room. Of course, in organizations such as the UN the force of the UN can still be put down but it is unlikely to be done by any state wishing to maintain a benefit of sorts through their relationship with the US.

Forever Wishing for the Human Project

At the end of the end of the asynchronous lecture, Professor Jackson asked which future trajectory was most likely or least likely of the power dynamics between countries. Although it is my favored prediction, the least likely future scenario in power transition is the human project. Out of the three scenarios, the one that appears to be the complete opposite of the human project, hegemonic institutions, appears the most likely.

I think for the most part, people would love for everyone to agree on something collectively as the human race. However, this is very unlikely as there remains a difference in opinion on large-scale issues, and whether or not they are even issues. An example of this is the different opinions on climate change. Although most countries believe that it is a global issue that must be worked on, there are countries that do not believe in working to end climate change with other global leaders, such as the United States. The Paris Climate Agreement is a prime example of a transition to the human project. Leaders from around the world got together to create goals they agreed to try to meet, in hopes of focusing on more renewable energy and limiting current pollution. This idea appeared to be working, humanity agreeing together to stop the destruction of our planet. That is until the idea of President Trump became a reality. Instead of agreeing to continue to do our best to help the planet, Trump decided to pull the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement.

I think that this illustrates that the hegemonic institutions scenario is the most likely, at least as long as Trump is president. On the other hand, to be fair, I don't think all of the blame for an unlikely "human project" falls on Trump. I believe that there will always be someone or some country in great power that relies on and enjoys using dominant power. As much as we would like to think that we could all work together for the greater good, there will always be someone that thinks they are strong enough to do things on their own, or who refuses to give up some of their power for a collective action. This all goes back to Hobbes' state of nature, humans are and always will be self-interested.


https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/forever-wishing-for-human-project.html

week 14 pre class

       This week’s readings have a myriad methods for analyzing power in a very traditional sense. Power as seen through the lens of military spending and GDP. I think that these traditional metrics leave a lot to be desired and are fundamentally changing. I have asserted in other writings that technology is adjusting the fabric of international relations and leading to changes requiring a major shift in the method of analysis.

       Linear relationships are often noted and the sum of power is a simple 2 part balance, Giddens, Mann, and Wallerstein note, “It is normally true that if a Power's resource base increases then its military power and geopolitical pretensions will also” pg 334. Economic power is harder to define with increased globalization. If we add military alliances into the mix these are also more muddied and difficult to separate as globalization often pulls most countries loyalty in opposing directions with increased economic integration and ideological conflict. Additionally how we define economic power is increasingly changing. The world is increasingly cyber based with assets like bitcoin residing completely on the internet. This is also adding a completely different metric to military power with the ability to steal massive amounts of information VIA the web as evident in Chinese and North Korean attacks in recent years. The playing field has been fundamentally altered shifting the power balance but the even more terrifying fact is that at this time we might not even fully understand what power will mean in the new era.

     It is clear though that the major world powers have adjusted their way of projecting power. The tightest control was always an official imperial empire. This method though is incredibly costly. In an official imperial status the country in charge has a responsibility to provide significant financial support and government services to solidify their legitimacy. If anything is happening negatively in a subbordinate country this leaves significant vulnerability, It is simply too difficult to maintain financial and moral superiority. There has obviously been a shift to hegemony with institutions like the U.N. that the U.S. can assert legitimate power. Power is exerted in different manners as well as having different metrics.

“Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” British Journal of Sociology 40:2 (1989).

John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,” Review of International Studies 30:4 (2004)

Week 13 Post-Class

Celebrity diplomacy is a bit of an abstract term which describes any celebrity involvement in international affairs and it can take many shapes. Celebrities can serve as advocates for international issues which require humanitarian aid (such as disease prevention), they can raise awareness of political oppression globally, and they can act as unofficial liasons with foreign government and non-government actors. At times, due to a combination of a lack of diplomatic training or general awareness of the intricacies of social problems they are advocating on behalf of, celebrities can do more harm than good, particularly when international politics are concerned. Because of this harmful potential, celebrity diplomacy is most benefitial for advocacy of humanitarian crises and fundraising for natural disasters.

Advocacy and fundraising efforts provide many PR and financial benefits to a region, and have limited opportunity for negative backlash. There are negative consequences from inappropriately advocating for or funding a particular cause, for example terrorist organizations could be funded or supported as a result of improper vetting. That being said, the likelihood of severely negative consequences is limited in scope, and on the whole the benefits of celebrity advocacy and fundraising greatly outweigh any potential risks inherent in these efforts.