We've come a long way in this course. I am glad that Hobbes was the foundation on which we built our learning as it provided a good reference point to which we could all look back and say, "Ah yes, that reminds me of man in the state of nature." I enjoyed watching everybody shift from initially deciding that Hobbes was pretty much on the ball to, by the end of the course, embracing completely constructivist or liberal norms. 15 weeks is a long period of learning for such a short amount of time.
The debate in class rounded out this course rather nicely. As we argued over what would be the end of American hegemony I couldn't help but notice everyone finding it almost hard to accept that there was nothing that could be done to prevent it, with some even offering solutions to counter the American fall. As if such a fall cannot happen, or else.
On a practical note, though my group chose GWOT as the major threat to American primacy, it is my estimation that China will be the end of American hegemony. As they advance technologically, economically, institutionally and militarily, it is only a matter of time before we are surpassed or at least weakened to the point of parity. America's decisions, like being unable to settle GWOT or other crises it is inextricably linked to across the globe, will only hasten that fall. As I discussed in my last post, it hurts me, but also brings me hope. Hope that we will live in a world one day where a hegemony is not needed, where borders no longer matter and we are citizens of this world, not of specific countries.
I enjoyed this course very much, it was a strong refresher for things I learned in undergrad, was a rude awakening for the things I did not, and was a good primer for what the MAIR program will be like (this is my first course in the program). If the courses from here on out are as stimulating, this experience will be a worthwhile one.
Group Blog for Prof. Shirk's International Studies: History, Theory, and Practice Class, May 2018
End of Hegemony, Beginning of the World
This topic is always a difficult one for me to face whenever it has come up in my studies of political science. Indeed as a military member it is one that weighs on me every day. I was born within the borders of the most powerful nation on the planet, riding high having just vanquished the Soviet Union, untouchable by any power. My country has acted with a free hand, sometimes with the most benevolent of intentions, sometimes not, for most of my life. Regardless of American missteps, however, I have never lost faith in American exceptionalism or in American stewardship of the international system. It is for that reason that the inevitable end of American hegemony pains me.
History has taught us that no empire lasts forever, with no exception. American hegemony will end, but when and how? Professor Jackson's lecture focused on hegemony, forecasting, and transitions of power. It also gets my brain going, wondering just how all of this will play out. Given a resurgent China, a war-weary America, and a resurgent Russia, how will the transition from American hegemony play out? I maintain that we are moving to a multipolar world with a handful of great powers helping maintain a system of lesser powers. I also maintain that this is the best outcome for my personal end goal for the world: the human project.
An end to hegemony will lead to Bremmer's G-Zero world, a scenario where a lack of global leadership means either greater cooperation or its opposite; he posits that we are already there, but I would say that American/Western leadership are still quite strong. I think that in this multipolar, G-Zero situation we'd see initial conflicts, some of which we have already seen brewing with Russia's resurgence and more adventurous Saudi and Israeli interventions. Watch for more as American hegemony wanes. Once we have settled in this new multipolar system I foresee a split to greater regional cooperation, as smaller states break for stronger regional guarantors of security and economic prosperity. Following this stage I think we will see greater global cooperation among these regions, with an eventual leap to a true world government.
History has taught us that no empire lasts forever, with no exception. American hegemony will end, but when and how? Professor Jackson's lecture focused on hegemony, forecasting, and transitions of power. It also gets my brain going, wondering just how all of this will play out. Given a resurgent China, a war-weary America, and a resurgent Russia, how will the transition from American hegemony play out? I maintain that we are moving to a multipolar world with a handful of great powers helping maintain a system of lesser powers. I also maintain that this is the best outcome for my personal end goal for the world: the human project.
An end to hegemony will lead to Bremmer's G-Zero world, a scenario where a lack of global leadership means either greater cooperation or its opposite; he posits that we are already there, but I would say that American/Western leadership are still quite strong. I think that in this multipolar, G-Zero situation we'd see initial conflicts, some of which we have already seen brewing with Russia's resurgence and more adventurous Saudi and Israeli interventions. Watch for more as American hegemony wanes. Once we have settled in this new multipolar system I foresee a split to greater regional cooperation, as smaller states break for stronger regional guarantors of security and economic prosperity. Following this stage I think we will see greater global cooperation among these regions, with an eventual leap to a true world government.
The Kind of Global Public Sphere
The concept of the global public sphere is an interesting one. In some ways it is almost a forum where everyone comes together to decide whether something is acceptable or not. On a global level and at the person to person tier such a forum doesn't exist. I, for example, do not have a way of sharing my thoughts with a man in Bangladesh on gun violence in the US, nor he with me. More formally, however, I believe that such a sphere does exist.
Take an organization like the UN, where one could reasonably say things are decided as "okay" or "not okay" by representatives of states. The argument could be made that states represent their respective publics, thereby ensuring that those "publics" all come together whenever the UN meets. It may sound like a stretch, but honestly I do not find any reason to discount it. Is every viewpoint held by every member of each public represented? No, but as the representatives of those publics, the ambassadors to the UN nonetheless are advocating on their behalf.
Following that line of thought we can see how the global public sphere has influenced our development as a planet over the past 50 years. In the United Nations we created an organization thats purpose is to prevent conflict, specifically great power conflict, but to a lesser degree conflict in general. That's a result of people coming together in an unprecedented way after WWII and declaring that conflict was "not okay." The UN also helped put together some of the most resilient and lasting international agreements on human rights and helping make the term "human rights" accepted vernacular. Representatives of publics came together and decided what was and wasn't a human right. The examples do not end. I focus on the UN because it is an easy target as it is one of the principle forum people think of when they think of formalized international forums, but other international organizations reflect the public sphere as well. At a more localized level, the EU is a perfect example of a public, with different states and peoples coming together because of coming to together and deciding, together, what is and isn't right.
So in summation a global public sphere exists in more formalized spaces like institutions, but a true commons where people from all over the world can come together and solve the world's problems isn't exactly there yet. The internet and communication technology have created the mechanisms for such a sphere to flourish, but as yet it has not.
Take an organization like the UN, where one could reasonably say things are decided as "okay" or "not okay" by representatives of states. The argument could be made that states represent their respective publics, thereby ensuring that those "publics" all come together whenever the UN meets. It may sound like a stretch, but honestly I do not find any reason to discount it. Is every viewpoint held by every member of each public represented? No, but as the representatives of those publics, the ambassadors to the UN nonetheless are advocating on their behalf.
Following that line of thought we can see how the global public sphere has influenced our development as a planet over the past 50 years. In the United Nations we created an organization thats purpose is to prevent conflict, specifically great power conflict, but to a lesser degree conflict in general. That's a result of people coming together in an unprecedented way after WWII and declaring that conflict was "not okay." The UN also helped put together some of the most resilient and lasting international agreements on human rights and helping make the term "human rights" accepted vernacular. Representatives of publics came together and decided what was and wasn't a human right. The examples do not end. I focus on the UN because it is an easy target as it is one of the principle forum people think of when they think of formalized international forums, but other international organizations reflect the public sphere as well. At a more localized level, the EU is a perfect example of a public, with different states and peoples coming together because of coming to together and deciding, together, what is and isn't right.
So in summation a global public sphere exists in more formalized spaces like institutions, but a true commons where people from all over the world can come together and solve the world's problems isn't exactly there yet. The internet and communication technology have created the mechanisms for such a sphere to flourish, but as yet it has not.
Celebrity Advocacy is a #GoodThing
There are costs and benefits to celebrity advocacy. On the one hand they can bring incredible amounts of attention to a cause or issue where there would otherwise be none, but on the other they can exacerbate a diplomatic situation or create more issues for those trying to rectify those problems. The argument between Dieter and Cooper, similarly played out in class, underscores these points, with cooper remaining optimistic and supportive of such advocacy and Dieter lambasting it. It begs the question, one asked in class, of whether celebrity advocacy is worth it?
I enjoyed this question very much because like states people are fairly autonomous actors, especially rich people who have a global audience and maintain passports that can get them wherever they want to go. If a famous person wants to advocate something, they're going to advocate for it and nothing you are I say will change that. But for the sake of argument I would like to take the side of defending celebrity advocacy.
While it is true that celebrities lack a mandate, "competence," and have the possibility of making a situation worse, the sheer number of pros for celebrity activism outweigh those cons. They can act far more quickly in crises than governments or organizations; there are no rules on how they spend money, thereby allowing them to marshal resources quickly and effectively for rapid reaction. They can slide between both the public and private spheres; a celebrity can influence both public and private actors because of their fame, allowing them to assist in positive outcomes for their cause. Some even have access to world leaders, diplomats, and politicians. Most importantly, however, they have access to the public. Celebrities, despite being rich and famous, remain far more relatable to people than a bookish diplomat or politician. When they talk people are already listening closer because, aside from their fame, they communicate on a similar wavelength. They are used to communicating to the public at large. As such, celebrities can raise awareness, fundraise, and call people to action far more effectively than a lay person or public servant ever could. The risk of them "making the situation worse" is always there. In my mind, however, doing nothing is always worse than trying to do something.
I enjoyed this question very much because like states people are fairly autonomous actors, especially rich people who have a global audience and maintain passports that can get them wherever they want to go. If a famous person wants to advocate something, they're going to advocate for it and nothing you are I say will change that. But for the sake of argument I would like to take the side of defending celebrity advocacy.
While it is true that celebrities lack a mandate, "competence," and have the possibility of making a situation worse, the sheer number of pros for celebrity activism outweigh those cons. They can act far more quickly in crises than governments or organizations; there are no rules on how they spend money, thereby allowing them to marshal resources quickly and effectively for rapid reaction. They can slide between both the public and private spheres; a celebrity can influence both public and private actors because of their fame, allowing them to assist in positive outcomes for their cause. Some even have access to world leaders, diplomats, and politicians. Most importantly, however, they have access to the public. Celebrities, despite being rich and famous, remain far more relatable to people than a bookish diplomat or politician. When they talk people are already listening closer because, aside from their fame, they communicate on a similar wavelength. They are used to communicating to the public at large. As such, celebrities can raise awareness, fundraise, and call people to action far more effectively than a lay person or public servant ever could. The risk of them "making the situation worse" is always there. In my mind, however, doing nothing is always worse than trying to do something.
Interests as Ideas vs Interests from Ideas
Having read Laffey and Weldes and Keohane and Goldstein and discussed it with the class, I must confess the whole breakdown of Laffey and Weldes is still nebulous and difficult to grasp. Some parts of the argument make sense to me, that the rationalists view ideas and interests as separate and the constructivists view them as one singular entity; in this way you get the interests coming from ideas and interests as ideas scenario.
I will continue to subscribe to the rationalist approach because it is, well, rational. The rationalist approach is an easier method of forecasting actor behavior than the constructivist one as far as ideas and interests go. In my mind as a student of political science that is by far the most important thing. But I cannot discount the constructivist approach out of hand because I know that it is the more realistic of the two, meaning that it seems more in line with human behavior. Laffey and Weldes treat ideas as social, that interests and ideas are symbiotic in that they react with one another and can't exist without one another. These points are true, but in practice become muddled.
The constructivists make good points, though, that undermine the rationalist position, at least as they approach the idea of, well, ideas. The way we look at the world determines how we go about approaching it. As such, our interests are tied to our ideas and cannot be separated. Weber has an even better point, though it is wrapped in a rather haughty and slightly racist essay, that rationality is an idea. Ditching the notion that rationality was developed by Europeans, the statement by itself does stand. People are not inherently rational; indeed rationality is an idea.
This module had my brain doing figure eights, but it also opened up the door for a newfound appreciation of the constructivist approach to IR.
I will continue to subscribe to the rationalist approach because it is, well, rational. The rationalist approach is an easier method of forecasting actor behavior than the constructivist one as far as ideas and interests go. In my mind as a student of political science that is by far the most important thing. But I cannot discount the constructivist approach out of hand because I know that it is the more realistic of the two, meaning that it seems more in line with human behavior. Laffey and Weldes treat ideas as social, that interests and ideas are symbiotic in that they react with one another and can't exist without one another. These points are true, but in practice become muddled.
The constructivists make good points, though, that undermine the rationalist position, at least as they approach the idea of, well, ideas. The way we look at the world determines how we go about approaching it. As such, our interests are tied to our ideas and cannot be separated. Weber has an even better point, though it is wrapped in a rather haughty and slightly racist essay, that rationality is an idea. Ditching the notion that rationality was developed by Europeans, the statement by itself does stand. People are not inherently rational; indeed rationality is an idea.
This module had my brain doing figure eights, but it also opened up the door for a newfound appreciation of the constructivist approach to IR.
Globalization and the End of Anarchy
Nothing in this world is a stronger motivator than money. Let's face it, like people, states are inherently self-interested. People will do just about anything for money, which begs the question, can money make people behave? Can it make states behave?
I thoroughly enjoyed Frieden and Rogowski's work for the sole purpose of their main idea: globalization constrains states. Their premise, and the point of my question above, is that money does make states behave. States love money so much they are willing to constrain themselves to get it. Apply it to organizations like the WTO. The WTO requires that its members submit their autonomy to the organization whenever they are called upon to settle a dispute. States must accept the WTO's decision or risk economic backlash from the other party in the dispute. But what is the alternative? To not be a part of the WTO risks huge loss in trade and economic protection. It is in everybody's benefit to play by the rules and constrain themselves so states go ahead and do it. Such constraint should have realists heading for the hills.
So long as the returns remain high states will continue to integrate, creating more and more constrained state actors. Liberal institutionalists will point to issue linkages, greater absolute gains, and lower risk of cheating being associated with globalization and, therefore, institutionalization. I would argue that that is all very true, but it is money that is going to be the driving force underpinning the system. Money will bring about a more integrated world.
I thoroughly enjoyed Frieden and Rogowski's work for the sole purpose of their main idea: globalization constrains states. Their premise, and the point of my question above, is that money does make states behave. States love money so much they are willing to constrain themselves to get it. Apply it to organizations like the WTO. The WTO requires that its members submit their autonomy to the organization whenever they are called upon to settle a dispute. States must accept the WTO's decision or risk economic backlash from the other party in the dispute. But what is the alternative? To not be a part of the WTO risks huge loss in trade and economic protection. It is in everybody's benefit to play by the rules and constrain themselves so states go ahead and do it. Such constraint should have realists heading for the hills.
So long as the returns remain high states will continue to integrate, creating more and more constrained state actors. Liberal institutionalists will point to issue linkages, greater absolute gains, and lower risk of cheating being associated with globalization and, therefore, institutionalization. I would argue that that is all very true, but it is money that is going to be the driving force underpinning the system. Money will bring about a more integrated world.
Week 15, Post-Class
I think my favorite part of this debate was seeing that, in
the end, most of our arguments relied on each other. I know there were several
times I noticed it in our group’s writing and in our opposing team's arguments. I would read something and think, “you know that could really be turned
around to support the opposing argument…” We have spent a lot of time in class
talking about the ways America is the biggest threat to America and global cooperation but tonight there was an overwhelming presence of the idea that the downfall of
America will be when the world decides they can go on without us.
Whether that means there is a new steward of the
international realm such as China, or people no longer can or want to immigrate
to the states, or that the world is sick of our war mongering, it seems that
one day the US will no longer have the resources or legitimacy to be the
hegemonic power. What’s more, in all our arguments we envisioned a transfer of
power to another party. Although we didn’t all argue for the same type of power
to be transferred – some thought it would be economic power, others security –
there was an implication that a weakened America will not lead to the easing of
sovereignty and towards a world
government but to ad hoc solutions in the areas where the US can no longer
lead.
week 9 pre class
I think the readings this week hit home for me as a veteran of military service as well as a family member of a police officer. I cannot avoid a sort of immediate emotional response to privatizing something that is the backbone of much of my life. Certainly we saw the drawbacks of privatized military forces operating such a Blackwater. They were allowed to accept risks and were not accountable to anyone. Ultimately they ended up hurting our military effort through reprisals as the result of their abuse. conversely we can look at what is going on today within the police departments with unnecessary deaths and copious videos of police brutality. We know that cops are under trained and under payed for the dangerous work they do. It is no secret that the private sector generally advances faster and has more resources available than the government sector. Certainly privatized security contractors have significantly more training as well as better resources than most of our military or even our police Officers. Private security firms provide customers with extensive video surveillance and high end technology. So this leads me to be concerned over further disadvantaging impoverished groups.
If countries increasingly privatize policing and basically create a scenario where each community is responsible for choosing government or private, won't this lead to poor communities receiving inferior support?
I think they way that Africa has managed to combine private and government into one command can help solve the issue of unity of command and ensuring that everyone received equal services.
Rita Abramson and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3:1 (2009).
If countries increasingly privatize policing and basically create a scenario where each community is responsible for choosing government or private, won't this lead to poor communities receiving inferior support?
I think they way that Africa has managed to combine private and government into one command can help solve the issue of unity of command and ensuring that everyone received equal services.
Rita Abramson and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3:1 (2009).
week 15 post class
I found this Modules readings very interesting. What leads to a great power rising or falling? There were many great theories proposed in the “Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” usually they concern over extending an empire. We analyzed the balance of power in our class discussions on america's greatest threats. We spent time analyzing the hard numbers and debated military might and transitions based on economic power and technological advancements. I think it is easy to analyze compare and try to crunch numbers but I think they miss something essential. We don't know how to truly define the tipping point. There is no equation that says at GDP - National debt + foreign wars X 15% equates to a failure or fundamental shift in a nation's power. There is no numbers that can show why the enlightenment was so successful, there is no way to predict the genius of Galileo. There is a very strong intangible in all of history. The human will or spirit does play a powerful role in shaping the strength of a nation. I think when we simply analyze the hard data we miss powerful forces that can help us explain this shift. Carl Jung theorized the collective unconcious to define undercurrents that shape humanity and create a shared backbone. I think when we discussed symbolic technologies in module we found a way in which these ideas weave their way into cultural influence and evolve. These forces are the true tipping factor. if we look at the fall of Rome it was surely over expanded but it was also corrupt. It was a Nation over indulgent in sport and hell bent on lavish parties and under educating it's citizens. The national spirit had erroded and no one was capable of saving it. There were certainly points where the people in power could have stepped aside or decided to invest in their country but they were more concerned with wealth. The true maker of breaker of a nation is the moral will of the people.
- “Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” British Journal of Sociology 40:2 (1989).
- Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” Review of International Studies 35:1 (2009)
Corporations: Political or Economic Actors
Are corporations political or economic actors
It's an important question to ask when thinking about the interaction of corporations, private actors, and states or organizations, public actors. Professor Jackson talks about this interaction, but here is a piece that in my mind needs addressing that I think is missing in the readings and the lecture about corporations: their inherently political nature.
Corporations exist almost solely for the purpose acquiring money. This point cannot be argued. What I feel is overlooked, however, is the means by which corporations, contending with political actors on an international scale, go about achieving their ends. Some would argue that corporations are primarily economic actors and I cannot stress enough how incorrect that assertion is. When corporations grow beyond the borders of a single state they inherently become political. In order to continue maximizing profits in the international realm inherently means acquiring political power. Corporations simply cannot conduct operations without interacting with political bodies. Therefore it is by necessity that these corporations are not just economic actors, but also political actors.
This is an important point to underscore especially when discussing the accountability of corporations vs states. Corporations are less constrained than many states because they are not accountable to anyone but their shareholders and the law. As long as corporations don't carry out heinous breaches of human rights or break international laws, shareholders are more than content if the money flows in. Because they are unconstrained and can essentially go where states cannot, coporations should be considered very potent political actors, as well.
It's an important question to ask when thinking about the interaction of corporations, private actors, and states or organizations, public actors. Professor Jackson talks about this interaction, but here is a piece that in my mind needs addressing that I think is missing in the readings and the lecture about corporations: their inherently political nature.
Corporations exist almost solely for the purpose acquiring money. This point cannot be argued. What I feel is overlooked, however, is the means by which corporations, contending with political actors on an international scale, go about achieving their ends. Some would argue that corporations are primarily economic actors and I cannot stress enough how incorrect that assertion is. When corporations grow beyond the borders of a single state they inherently become political. In order to continue maximizing profits in the international realm inherently means acquiring political power. Corporations simply cannot conduct operations without interacting with political bodies. Therefore it is by necessity that these corporations are not just economic actors, but also political actors.
This is an important point to underscore especially when discussing the accountability of corporations vs states. Corporations are less constrained than many states because they are not accountable to anyone but their shareholders and the law. As long as corporations don't carry out heinous breaches of human rights or break international laws, shareholders are more than content if the money flows in. Because they are unconstrained and can essentially go where states cannot, coporations should be considered very potent political actors, as well.
Week 15 Post Class
This last class brought many different perspectives into the issue of the downfall of the United States, and aside from the issue of internal polarization (which was OBVIOUSLY the best argument of all...) the greatest threat to US global hegemony arises from China.
The threat posed by China isn't necessarily a military one (although they do flex their muscles on the regional level in the South China Sea), but an economic one. China has been transitioning away from an economy focused on manufacturing towards one based on innovation. Admittedly, the success in this venture has yet to be seen, but growing optimism at the potential of emerging tech scenes in Shenzhen and Beijing has made venture capitialists invest in China's technology at a growing rate. If China was able to foster this economic development, it could seek to challenage the US as the technologic hub of the world.
Historically, China's aspirations have been regional rather than global, but Premier Xi Jinping has more international goals than his predicessors. Unlike the American way of projecting power and asserting dominance, China doesn't expect other countries to adapt their system of governance or way of life (regionally thats a different story, but this is in the global conversation). Rather, they simply expect ownership over critical infrastructure within countries and to have a say in their local politics, like in Djibouti for example. This affords China the ability to manipulate states without having any moral obligation to favor one state over the other. China's ambitions have shifted to the global arena, and with their view on hegemony they won't have as many moral constraints to hold them back as did the liberal US hegemony.
The threat posed by China isn't necessarily a military one (although they do flex their muscles on the regional level in the South China Sea), but an economic one. China has been transitioning away from an economy focused on manufacturing towards one based on innovation. Admittedly, the success in this venture has yet to be seen, but growing optimism at the potential of emerging tech scenes in Shenzhen and Beijing has made venture capitialists invest in China's technology at a growing rate. If China was able to foster this economic development, it could seek to challenage the US as the technologic hub of the world.
Historically, China's aspirations have been regional rather than global, but Premier Xi Jinping has more international goals than his predicessors. Unlike the American way of projecting power and asserting dominance, China doesn't expect other countries to adapt their system of governance or way of life (regionally thats a different story, but this is in the global conversation). Rather, they simply expect ownership over critical infrastructure within countries and to have a say in their local politics, like in Djibouti for example. This affords China the ability to manipulate states without having any moral obligation to favor one state over the other. China's ambitions have shifted to the global arena, and with their view on hegemony they won't have as many moral constraints to hold them back as did the liberal US hegemony.
Downfall of U.S. Hegemonic Power
Our last week of class was an interesting experience. More
and more I found that I actually do think the greatest threat to the United
States role as a hegemonic power, is ourselves. We have always had some level
of isolationist policy, but this has increased in recent years. Specifically,
when looking at the past two years under the Trump administration, our policy
has been to withdrawal from the global governance structure whenever we
disagree with a proposed action or stance. However, it needs to be reiterated
to the administration, and its supporters, that if you do not like something,
then change it. The only way to effectively change the policy of an
organization is by being a respected part of the body. There have been multiple
times when I have heard President Trump argue that the direction of an
organization or structure is wrong, that’s why we must leave. But this only
removes our position as a respected member of the global community, and forces
countries to work on solutions without us having a seat at the table.
When looking at other groups arguments, I did find them compelling, even believing that they are a threat to U.S. hegemonic power, but not the biggest threat. Looking at the global war on terror argument, I had a hard time grasping just why the group thought this was the greatest threat. Yes, the United States does spend an enormous amount of money on the GWOT, but I would argue that this places us in front of the eyes of other countries, reiterating our global hegemonic power.
Even with the possible lose of hegemonic power, I do not see this happening in the near future. If we continue on this path, it could definitely happen, just not within the next 5 years.
https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/downfall-of-us-hegemonic-power.html
When looking at other groups arguments, I did find them compelling, even believing that they are a threat to U.S. hegemonic power, but not the biggest threat. Looking at the global war on terror argument, I had a hard time grasping just why the group thought this was the greatest threat. Yes, the United States does spend an enormous amount of money on the GWOT, but I would argue that this places us in front of the eyes of other countries, reiterating our global hegemonic power.
Even with the possible lose of hegemonic power, I do not see this happening in the near future. If we continue on this path, it could definitely happen, just not within the next 5 years.
https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/downfall-of-us-hegemonic-power.html
Week 15-Pre Class
Professor Jackson mentioned in his lectures the various methods of hegemonic transitions and raised the questions of what would be the most likely outcomes, and the most desirable outcomes. Given these are two of the most significant questions looming in the field of international relations and one of the final blog posts, I will provide my own prognosis to the question of what is the most desired outcome based on the material we have covered in class to date.
I believe that the most desirable of the scenario's which Professor Jackson mentioned would be the creation of hegemonic institutions which would create certain boundaries for state actors to operate within. I believe that this the current liberal hegemonic world order which the United States has created and fostered since World War II is the most ideal from the perspective of preserving the fundamental human rights valued by the Western liberal order. Preserving this type of order in some capacity as the dominant order helps maintain unipolarity or at the very least offers a balance to the rising Asian powers, which helps preserves some global balance of powers. The type of liberal world order I suggest is not necessarily led by the United States, which has long been the military and economic might of the Western world, but could be the result of some resurgence in Europe or a revival of the ideals for liberal democracy globally.
The current direction of the world order currently however is that with the decline in strength of the liberal hegemonic world order (note that this is not exclusively the US) appears to favour a more multi-polar world where there is no clear hegemonic power. A multipolar world is tantamount to a Hobbsian state of nature, making an already anarchic global system of interstate relations even less bound to the few rules and norms set in place. A bipolar world at least provides states with clarity of goals and interests, either support one of the global hegemons in China, or the old guard of the liberal hegemonic world order. It is highly unlikely that China will emerge as a great power on the international stage, and historically has preferred to exercise it's great power status in the regional context rather than the global stage, however Chairman Xi Jinping has made known his global ambitions with the One Belt One Road projects and could assert China's power on a more global level.
Ultimately, the most desirable transition of hegemonic power away from the US would see the liberal hegemonic world order preserved in some capacity. The institutions which it has created such as NATO or the IMF would help preserve the legacy of the US's world order, as would a rise of European significance, or the re-emergence of liberal democracy globally. At the very least, an avoidance of creating a multipolar world would be highly undesirable, and should be avoided if possible.
I believe that the most desirable of the scenario's which Professor Jackson mentioned would be the creation of hegemonic institutions which would create certain boundaries for state actors to operate within. I believe that this the current liberal hegemonic world order which the United States has created and fostered since World War II is the most ideal from the perspective of preserving the fundamental human rights valued by the Western liberal order. Preserving this type of order in some capacity as the dominant order helps maintain unipolarity or at the very least offers a balance to the rising Asian powers, which helps preserves some global balance of powers. The type of liberal world order I suggest is not necessarily led by the United States, which has long been the military and economic might of the Western world, but could be the result of some resurgence in Europe or a revival of the ideals for liberal democracy globally.
The current direction of the world order currently however is that with the decline in strength of the liberal hegemonic world order (note that this is not exclusively the US) appears to favour a more multi-polar world where there is no clear hegemonic power. A multipolar world is tantamount to a Hobbsian state of nature, making an already anarchic global system of interstate relations even less bound to the few rules and norms set in place. A bipolar world at least provides states with clarity of goals and interests, either support one of the global hegemons in China, or the old guard of the liberal hegemonic world order. It is highly unlikely that China will emerge as a great power on the international stage, and historically has preferred to exercise it's great power status in the regional context rather than the global stage, however Chairman Xi Jinping has made known his global ambitions with the One Belt One Road projects and could assert China's power on a more global level.
Ultimately, the most desirable transition of hegemonic power away from the US would see the liberal hegemonic world order preserved in some capacity. The institutions which it has created such as NATO or the IMF would help preserve the legacy of the US's world order, as would a rise of European significance, or the re-emergence of liberal democracy globally. At the very least, an avoidance of creating a multipolar world would be highly undesirable, and should be avoided if possible.
Week 15 pre-class
The Melian Dialogue offers perspective on the issues of realism vs. idealism and what a "just empire" is, and this logical can be used to examine the American situation. The Athenians represent the realist perspective, they believe that the goal of the state is to ensure it's own security, and great powers can only reinforce their security by gaining more power. On the other side of the debate the Melians believed that they are acting from a moral high-ground, and believed that others would act on their behalf and intervene for their cause. The Melians didn't believe that the Athenians were just in their actions, however the Athenians affirmed that they had defended the Greek civilization from the Persians and that any course of action they take to protect their empire (which they saw incorporating Melos as doing) would make that a just action. This begs the question for great powers, does the end justify the means for the self-preservation of hegemony? And what is the morality that guides hegemons?
In the American case, morality has served as the justification for the expansion of American influence abroad, specifically regarding the ideals of Western democracy, however this is simply a thinly veiled guise. We can see this specifically framed within the context of the countries of Ukraine and Georgia and their goals of NATO membership. The US was willing to support their cause in terms of funding and logistics when these countries were in the process of leaving the Russian sphere of influence, however with the threat of Russian military aggression the US hasn't provided anything more than nominal support for the Ukrainian and Georgian causes. We can see American expansionism behind the guise of morality in the case of the Iraq War as well, with the US invading on the grounds of liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless regime and combatting global terror. Ultimately what the US ended up pursuing was simply expanding influence in the regime by way of regime change. In the end, the timeless words of Thusydides ring true when it comes to great powers, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."
In the American case, morality has served as the justification for the expansion of American influence abroad, specifically regarding the ideals of Western democracy, however this is simply a thinly veiled guise. We can see this specifically framed within the context of the countries of Ukraine and Georgia and their goals of NATO membership. The US was willing to support their cause in terms of funding and logistics when these countries were in the process of leaving the Russian sphere of influence, however with the threat of Russian military aggression the US hasn't provided anything more than nominal support for the Ukrainian and Georgian causes. We can see American expansionism behind the guise of morality in the case of the Iraq War as well, with the US invading on the grounds of liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless regime and combatting global terror. Ultimately what the US ended up pursuing was simply expanding influence in the regime by way of regime change. In the end, the timeless words of Thusydides ring true when it comes to great powers, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."
The Rise of the PMC, End of the State
I could not help myself from linking everything private security/military related in the readings to things I have read in fictional literature. It made me wonder if the writers of the novels I read were actually students of international relations. I digress.
Abrahamsen and Williams brought up some really interesting points that I wanted to hone non. They really captured the scale of the growth of private security. The fact that private security outnumbers police forces by 2:1 in the UK, 3:1 in the US, and the entire military is outnumbered in India speaks volumes about how different the system has become. Their argument, that security is increasingly beyond the state, has resonated with me. I don't think it's as doom and gloom as they predict, that those states that have delegated the "monopoly" on violence have contributed to their own demise. I think that is very true for weaker states where private military and security companies continue to grow stronger day to day, but I don't think it means the end of states.
There's a Tom Clancy novel (not written by him, but in his name) called HAWX and it covers a topic very much like this. The gist of it is that in the near future most governments contract most of their military and security needs out to private companies. Eventually the interests of those companies diverge from those of the state and the novel climaxes with one of the largest PMCs almost successfully staging a coup against the government of the United States (thankfully stopped by some scrappy former F-16 pilots). What I enjoyed about the book and why I find it so interesting in the context of these readings is that as states delegate more and more of their authority it leads me to question: what happens when private companies, with their own interests, decide that they are in charge? It seems farfetched that a private company could ever usurp challenge the United States, but smaller, weaker states? Failed or failing states? What happens if a PMC becomes the "legitimate" owner of a state? I don't see it as likely, but I definitely see it as possible.
Abrahamsen and Williams brought up some really interesting points that I wanted to hone non. They really captured the scale of the growth of private security. The fact that private security outnumbers police forces by 2:1 in the UK, 3:1 in the US, and the entire military is outnumbered in India speaks volumes about how different the system has become. Their argument, that security is increasingly beyond the state, has resonated with me. I don't think it's as doom and gloom as they predict, that those states that have delegated the "monopoly" on violence have contributed to their own demise. I think that is very true for weaker states where private military and security companies continue to grow stronger day to day, but I don't think it means the end of states.
There's a Tom Clancy novel (not written by him, but in his name) called HAWX and it covers a topic very much like this. The gist of it is that in the near future most governments contract most of their military and security needs out to private companies. Eventually the interests of those companies diverge from those of the state and the novel climaxes with one of the largest PMCs almost successfully staging a coup against the government of the United States (thankfully stopped by some scrappy former F-16 pilots). What I enjoyed about the book and why I find it so interesting in the context of these readings is that as states delegate more and more of their authority it leads me to question: what happens when private companies, with their own interests, decide that they are in charge? It seems farfetched that a private company could ever usurp challenge the United States, but smaller, weaker states? Failed or failing states? What happens if a PMC becomes the "legitimate" owner of a state? I don't see it as likely, but I definitely see it as possible.
Public Authority and the International System
This module was particularly interesting to me in that it covered questions and concepts that deal with the idea of an end to the current framework of the international system. As the system continues to integrate further and states become more and more interdependent, the idea of single, unitary actors becomes increasingly more difficult to defend. International law is one such method of integration that begs the question, can the impermeable, autonomous states of yesterday make it through today and into tomorrow?
The part of Professor Jackson's lecture that I love the most is where he talks about how difficult it is for the idea of public authority to exist in the upper left box of the 2x2. As there is no sovereign in the international system yet, states acting as both public and authority is such an interesting concept. It is one of the stronger arguments for the increasing permeability and loosening of autonomy going on in the system. Sovereigns choosing to bind themselves and be accountable to authority from without, granted authority enforced by other states. It raises more questions for me. If sovereigns are willing to forfeit autonomy to others for the sake of international law, is it unreasonable to assume that they could, down the line, cede it to a sovereign to maintain such law? Would a sovereign not be more impartial than a series of other states with divergent interests? By extension, would the application of violence by a sovereign not be more impartial, too?
The part of Professor Jackson's lecture that I love the most is where he talks about how difficult it is for the idea of public authority to exist in the upper left box of the 2x2. As there is no sovereign in the international system yet, states acting as both public and authority is such an interesting concept. It is one of the stronger arguments for the increasing permeability and loosening of autonomy going on in the system. Sovereigns choosing to bind themselves and be accountable to authority from without, granted authority enforced by other states. It raises more questions for me. If sovereigns are willing to forfeit autonomy to others for the sake of international law, is it unreasonable to assume that they could, down the line, cede it to a sovereign to maintain such law? Would a sovereign not be more impartial than a series of other states with divergent interests? By extension, would the application of violence by a sovereign not be more impartial, too?
Week 14 Pre-Class
Constitutional movements, as defined in the lectures by Professor Jackson, are intended to provide informal sets of rules and boundaries for great and middle powers. These constitutions, treaties, or agreements are intended to instate some balance of powers after a significant war or shift in power balance. More often than not, they seek to reinstate the previous hegemonic order in some capacity and reinforce the strength of great powers which emerged after the power flux. These types of agreements are bound to fail in the long term however, as they seek to recapture a picture in time (so to speak) and are unable to account to the dynamic nature of power relationships in the realm of the international.
Two notable examples of how constitutional movements fail to stand the test of time are the Congress of Vienna and the Yalta Conference. The purpose of the Congress of Vienna was to reestablish the previous monarchical order in Europe and redistribute land and power to avoid another significant war in Europe following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Ultimately however, nationalism and the rise in democratic ideologies brought forth civil wars and turmoil which the Congress sought to curtail. The Yalta Conference sought to reinstate order in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, with the U.S. and Soviet Union rising as great powers after the collapse of Germany. The treaty's purpose was to carve sphere's of influence in Europe between Western influence and the influence of the Soviet Union, as to avoid any future conflict in the region. Despite these efforts however, the Cold War still occurred and the struggle for dominance in Europe (and elsewhere) was unaffected by this attempt at peace.
Constitutional movements are intended to create order out of chaos and entrench the powers which arise out of a conflict. These movements are unable to stand the test of time though, as they do not account for the many factors which affect the realm of the international (social movements, clashes of personalities, and economic movements for example). As such, they capture a snapshot in time, but cannot survive in the dynamic nature that is the international.
Two notable examples of how constitutional movements fail to stand the test of time are the Congress of Vienna and the Yalta Conference. The purpose of the Congress of Vienna was to reestablish the previous monarchical order in Europe and redistribute land and power to avoid another significant war in Europe following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Ultimately however, nationalism and the rise in democratic ideologies brought forth civil wars and turmoil which the Congress sought to curtail. The Yalta Conference sought to reinstate order in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, with the U.S. and Soviet Union rising as great powers after the collapse of Germany. The treaty's purpose was to carve sphere's of influence in Europe between Western influence and the influence of the Soviet Union, as to avoid any future conflict in the region. Despite these efforts however, the Cold War still occurred and the struggle for dominance in Europe (and elsewhere) was unaffected by this attempt at peace.
Constitutional movements are intended to create order out of chaos and entrench the powers which arise out of a conflict. These movements are unable to stand the test of time though, as they do not account for the many factors which affect the realm of the international (social movements, clashes of personalities, and economic movements for example). As such, they capture a snapshot in time, but cannot survive in the dynamic nature that is the international.
Week 14 pre-class
I’m torn between the likelihood of a hegemonic future with
the US at the center and a push towards a constitutional moment. Historically
we’ve seen constitutional moments come out of global crises or world wars, but
I think many of the ideas and social movements that have been previously
discussed in class could push the international realm closer to a
constitutional moment which isn’t fraught with conflict and disaster. Maybe the
“human project” scenario isn’t likely in the near future but, as professor
Jackson said, maybe our prediction odds are better if we just flip a coin!
I found John Ikenberry’s points on the US possessing several
elements of a hegemonic power rather convincing, although I wouldn’t go so far
as to call it an empire just yet. Mostly because the sustainability of hegemony,
after coercive power, seems to rely on the benefits provided by the hegemon to
those at different levels along the hierarchical chain. In that case one of the
worst things the US could do would be to make other states lose sight of the
benefits the US offers in the international realm and our current administration
seems to have a knack for making long standing partners and beneficiaries doubt
their relationship with the US. Essentially, the US, under the guise of picking
up new relationships, could struggle to maintain the old.
Another point that stood out to me from Ikenberry’s text was
that hegemon will create institution to facilitate multilateral relationships
but will ultimately be the central sovereign figure. The US has, in most
instances, helped create multilateral institutions on a global scale and then
taken those over as that eight-ton gorilla in the room. Of course, in organizations
such as the UN the force of the UN can still be put down but it is unlikely to
be done by any state wishing to maintain a benefit of sorts through their
relationship with the US.
Forever Wishing for the Human Project
At the end of the end of the asynchronous lecture, Professor Jackson asked which future trajectory was most likely or least likely of the power dynamics between countries. Although it is my favored prediction, the least likely future scenario in power transition is the human project. Out of the three scenarios, the one that appears to be the complete opposite of the human project, hegemonic institutions, appears the most likely.
I think for the most part, people would love for everyone to agree on something collectively as the human race. However, this is very unlikely as there remains a difference in opinion on large-scale issues, and whether or not they are even issues. An example of this is the different opinions on climate change. Although most countries believe that it is a global issue that must be worked on, there are countries that do not believe in working to end climate change with other global leaders, such as the United States. The Paris Climate Agreement is a prime example of a transition to the human project. Leaders from around the world got together to create goals they agreed to try to meet, in hopes of focusing on more renewable energy and limiting current pollution. This idea appeared to be working, humanity agreeing together to stop the destruction of our planet. That is until the idea of President Trump became a reality. Instead of agreeing to continue to do our best to help the planet, Trump decided to pull the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement.
I think that this illustrates that the hegemonic institutions scenario is the most likely, at least as long as Trump is president. On the other hand, to be fair, I don't think all of the blame for an unlikely "human project" falls on Trump. I believe that there will always be someone or some country in great power that relies on and enjoys using dominant power. As much as we would like to think that we could all work together for the greater good, there will always be someone that thinks they are strong enough to do things on their own, or who refuses to give up some of their power for a collective action. This all goes back to Hobbes' state of nature, humans are and always will be self-interested.
https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/forever-wishing-for-human-project.html
I think for the most part, people would love for everyone to agree on something collectively as the human race. However, this is very unlikely as there remains a difference in opinion on large-scale issues, and whether or not they are even issues. An example of this is the different opinions on climate change. Although most countries believe that it is a global issue that must be worked on, there are countries that do not believe in working to end climate change with other global leaders, such as the United States. The Paris Climate Agreement is a prime example of a transition to the human project. Leaders from around the world got together to create goals they agreed to try to meet, in hopes of focusing on more renewable energy and limiting current pollution. This idea appeared to be working, humanity agreeing together to stop the destruction of our planet. That is until the idea of President Trump became a reality. Instead of agreeing to continue to do our best to help the planet, Trump decided to pull the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement.
I think that this illustrates that the hegemonic institutions scenario is the most likely, at least as long as Trump is president. On the other hand, to be fair, I don't think all of the blame for an unlikely "human project" falls on Trump. I believe that there will always be someone or some country in great power that relies on and enjoys using dominant power. As much as we would like to think that we could all work together for the greater good, there will always be someone that thinks they are strong enough to do things on their own, or who refuses to give up some of their power for a collective action. This all goes back to Hobbes' state of nature, humans are and always will be self-interested.
https://auisgroup1summer18.blogspot.com/2018/08/forever-wishing-for-human-project.html
week 14 pre class
This week’s readings have a myriad methods for analyzing
power in a very traditional sense. Power as seen through the lens of military
spending and GDP. I think that these traditional metrics leave a lot to be
desired and are fundamentally changing. I have asserted in other writings that
technology is adjusting the fabric of international relations and leading to
changes requiring a major shift in the method of analysis.
Linear relationships are
often noted and the sum of power is a simple 2 part balance, Giddens, Mann, and
Wallerstein note, “It is normally true that if a Power's resource base
increases then its military power and geopolitical pretensions will also” pg
334. Economic power is harder to define with increased globalization.
If we add military alliances into the mix these are also more muddied and
difficult to separate as globalization often pulls most countries loyalty in
opposing directions with increased economic integration and ideological
conflict. Additionally how we define economic power is increasingly changing.
The world is increasingly cyber based with assets like bitcoin residing
completely on the internet. This is also adding a completely different metric
to military power with the ability to steal massive amounts of information VIA
the web as evident in Chinese and North Korean attacks in recent years. The
playing field has been fundamentally altered shifting the power balance but the
even more terrifying fact is that at this time we might not even fully
understand what power will mean in the new era.
It is clear though that the major world powers have adjusted their way of projecting power. The tightest control was always an official imperial empire. This method though is incredibly costly. In an official imperial status the country in charge has a responsibility to provide significant financial support and government services to solidify their legitimacy. If anything is happening negatively in a subbordinate country this leaves significant vulnerability, It is simply too difficult to maintain financial and moral superiority. There has obviously been a shift to hegemony with institutions like the U.N. that the U.S. can assert legitimate power. Power is exerted in different manners as well as having different metrics.
“Comments on Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” British Journal of Sociology 40:2 (1989).
John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,” Review of International Studies 30:4 (2004)
Week 13 Post-Class
Celebrity diplomacy is a bit of an abstract term which describes any celebrity involvement in international affairs and it can take many shapes. Celebrities can serve as advocates for international issues which require humanitarian aid (such as disease prevention), they can raise awareness of political oppression globally, and they can act as unofficial liasons with foreign government and non-government actors. At times, due to a combination of a lack of diplomatic training or general awareness of the intricacies of social problems they are advocating on behalf of, celebrities can do more harm than good, particularly when international politics are concerned. Because of this harmful potential, celebrity diplomacy is most benefitial for advocacy of humanitarian crises and fundraising for natural disasters.
Advocacy and fundraising efforts provide many PR and financial benefits to a region, and have limited opportunity for negative backlash. There are negative consequences from inappropriately advocating for or funding a particular cause, for example terrorist organizations could be funded or supported as a result of improper vetting. That being said, the likelihood of severely negative consequences is limited in scope, and on the whole the benefits of celebrity advocacy and fundraising greatly outweigh any potential risks inherent in these efforts.
Advocacy and fundraising efforts provide many PR and financial benefits to a region, and have limited opportunity for negative backlash. There are negative consequences from inappropriately advocating for or funding a particular cause, for example terrorist organizations could be funded or supported as a result of improper vetting. That being said, the likelihood of severely negative consequences is limited in scope, and on the whole the benefits of celebrity advocacy and fundraising greatly outweigh any potential risks inherent in these efforts.
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We've come a long way in this course. I am glad that Hobbes was the foundation on which we built our learning as it provided a good refe...