We've come a long way in this course. I am glad that Hobbes was the foundation on which we built our learning as it provided a good reference point to which we could all look back and say, "Ah yes, that reminds me of man in the state of nature." I enjoyed watching everybody shift from initially deciding that Hobbes was pretty much on the ball to, by the end of the course, embracing completely constructivist or liberal norms. 15 weeks is a long period of learning for such a short amount of time.
The debate in class rounded out this course rather nicely. As we argued over what would be the end of American hegemony I couldn't help but notice everyone finding it almost hard to accept that there was nothing that could be done to prevent it, with some even offering solutions to counter the American fall. As if such a fall cannot happen, or else.
On a practical note, though my group chose GWOT as the major threat to American primacy, it is my estimation that China will be the end of American hegemony. As they advance technologically, economically, institutionally and militarily, it is only a matter of time before we are surpassed or at least weakened to the point of parity. America's decisions, like being unable to settle GWOT or other crises it is inextricably linked to across the globe, will only hasten that fall. As I discussed in my last post, it hurts me, but also brings me hope. Hope that we will live in a world one day where a hegemony is not needed, where borders no longer matter and we are citizens of this world, not of specific countries.
I enjoyed this course very much, it was a strong refresher for things I learned in undergrad, was a rude awakening for the things I did not, and was a good primer for what the MAIR program will be like (this is my first course in the program). If the courses from here on out are as stimulating, this experience will be a worthwhile one.
Blog Group 1 International Studies, Summer 2018
Group Blog for Prof. Shirk's International Studies: History, Theory, and Practice Class, May 2018
End of Hegemony, Beginning of the World
This topic is always a difficult one for me to face whenever it has come up in my studies of political science. Indeed as a military member it is one that weighs on me every day. I was born within the borders of the most powerful nation on the planet, riding high having just vanquished the Soviet Union, untouchable by any power. My country has acted with a free hand, sometimes with the most benevolent of intentions, sometimes not, for most of my life. Regardless of American missteps, however, I have never lost faith in American exceptionalism or in American stewardship of the international system. It is for that reason that the inevitable end of American hegemony pains me.
History has taught us that no empire lasts forever, with no exception. American hegemony will end, but when and how? Professor Jackson's lecture focused on hegemony, forecasting, and transitions of power. It also gets my brain going, wondering just how all of this will play out. Given a resurgent China, a war-weary America, and a resurgent Russia, how will the transition from American hegemony play out? I maintain that we are moving to a multipolar world with a handful of great powers helping maintain a system of lesser powers. I also maintain that this is the best outcome for my personal end goal for the world: the human project.
An end to hegemony will lead to Bremmer's G-Zero world, a scenario where a lack of global leadership means either greater cooperation or its opposite; he posits that we are already there, but I would say that American/Western leadership are still quite strong. I think that in this multipolar, G-Zero situation we'd see initial conflicts, some of which we have already seen brewing with Russia's resurgence and more adventurous Saudi and Israeli interventions. Watch for more as American hegemony wanes. Once we have settled in this new multipolar system I foresee a split to greater regional cooperation, as smaller states break for stronger regional guarantors of security and economic prosperity. Following this stage I think we will see greater global cooperation among these regions, with an eventual leap to a true world government.
History has taught us that no empire lasts forever, with no exception. American hegemony will end, but when and how? Professor Jackson's lecture focused on hegemony, forecasting, and transitions of power. It also gets my brain going, wondering just how all of this will play out. Given a resurgent China, a war-weary America, and a resurgent Russia, how will the transition from American hegemony play out? I maintain that we are moving to a multipolar world with a handful of great powers helping maintain a system of lesser powers. I also maintain that this is the best outcome for my personal end goal for the world: the human project.
An end to hegemony will lead to Bremmer's G-Zero world, a scenario where a lack of global leadership means either greater cooperation or its opposite; he posits that we are already there, but I would say that American/Western leadership are still quite strong. I think that in this multipolar, G-Zero situation we'd see initial conflicts, some of which we have already seen brewing with Russia's resurgence and more adventurous Saudi and Israeli interventions. Watch for more as American hegemony wanes. Once we have settled in this new multipolar system I foresee a split to greater regional cooperation, as smaller states break for stronger regional guarantors of security and economic prosperity. Following this stage I think we will see greater global cooperation among these regions, with an eventual leap to a true world government.
The Kind of Global Public Sphere
The concept of the global public sphere is an interesting one. In some ways it is almost a forum where everyone comes together to decide whether something is acceptable or not. On a global level and at the person to person tier such a forum doesn't exist. I, for example, do not have a way of sharing my thoughts with a man in Bangladesh on gun violence in the US, nor he with me. More formally, however, I believe that such a sphere does exist.
Take an organization like the UN, where one could reasonably say things are decided as "okay" or "not okay" by representatives of states. The argument could be made that states represent their respective publics, thereby ensuring that those "publics" all come together whenever the UN meets. It may sound like a stretch, but honestly I do not find any reason to discount it. Is every viewpoint held by every member of each public represented? No, but as the representatives of those publics, the ambassadors to the UN nonetheless are advocating on their behalf.
Following that line of thought we can see how the global public sphere has influenced our development as a planet over the past 50 years. In the United Nations we created an organization thats purpose is to prevent conflict, specifically great power conflict, but to a lesser degree conflict in general. That's a result of people coming together in an unprecedented way after WWII and declaring that conflict was "not okay." The UN also helped put together some of the most resilient and lasting international agreements on human rights and helping make the term "human rights" accepted vernacular. Representatives of publics came together and decided what was and wasn't a human right. The examples do not end. I focus on the UN because it is an easy target as it is one of the principle forum people think of when they think of formalized international forums, but other international organizations reflect the public sphere as well. At a more localized level, the EU is a perfect example of a public, with different states and peoples coming together because of coming to together and deciding, together, what is and isn't right.
So in summation a global public sphere exists in more formalized spaces like institutions, but a true commons where people from all over the world can come together and solve the world's problems isn't exactly there yet. The internet and communication technology have created the mechanisms for such a sphere to flourish, but as yet it has not.
Take an organization like the UN, where one could reasonably say things are decided as "okay" or "not okay" by representatives of states. The argument could be made that states represent their respective publics, thereby ensuring that those "publics" all come together whenever the UN meets. It may sound like a stretch, but honestly I do not find any reason to discount it. Is every viewpoint held by every member of each public represented? No, but as the representatives of those publics, the ambassadors to the UN nonetheless are advocating on their behalf.
Following that line of thought we can see how the global public sphere has influenced our development as a planet over the past 50 years. In the United Nations we created an organization thats purpose is to prevent conflict, specifically great power conflict, but to a lesser degree conflict in general. That's a result of people coming together in an unprecedented way after WWII and declaring that conflict was "not okay." The UN also helped put together some of the most resilient and lasting international agreements on human rights and helping make the term "human rights" accepted vernacular. Representatives of publics came together and decided what was and wasn't a human right. The examples do not end. I focus on the UN because it is an easy target as it is one of the principle forum people think of when they think of formalized international forums, but other international organizations reflect the public sphere as well. At a more localized level, the EU is a perfect example of a public, with different states and peoples coming together because of coming to together and deciding, together, what is and isn't right.
So in summation a global public sphere exists in more formalized spaces like institutions, but a true commons where people from all over the world can come together and solve the world's problems isn't exactly there yet. The internet and communication technology have created the mechanisms for such a sphere to flourish, but as yet it has not.
Celebrity Advocacy is a #GoodThing
There are costs and benefits to celebrity advocacy. On the one hand they can bring incredible amounts of attention to a cause or issue where there would otherwise be none, but on the other they can exacerbate a diplomatic situation or create more issues for those trying to rectify those problems. The argument between Dieter and Cooper, similarly played out in class, underscores these points, with cooper remaining optimistic and supportive of such advocacy and Dieter lambasting it. It begs the question, one asked in class, of whether celebrity advocacy is worth it?
I enjoyed this question very much because like states people are fairly autonomous actors, especially rich people who have a global audience and maintain passports that can get them wherever they want to go. If a famous person wants to advocate something, they're going to advocate for it and nothing you are I say will change that. But for the sake of argument I would like to take the side of defending celebrity advocacy.
While it is true that celebrities lack a mandate, "competence," and have the possibility of making a situation worse, the sheer number of pros for celebrity activism outweigh those cons. They can act far more quickly in crises than governments or organizations; there are no rules on how they spend money, thereby allowing them to marshal resources quickly and effectively for rapid reaction. They can slide between both the public and private spheres; a celebrity can influence both public and private actors because of their fame, allowing them to assist in positive outcomes for their cause. Some even have access to world leaders, diplomats, and politicians. Most importantly, however, they have access to the public. Celebrities, despite being rich and famous, remain far more relatable to people than a bookish diplomat or politician. When they talk people are already listening closer because, aside from their fame, they communicate on a similar wavelength. They are used to communicating to the public at large. As such, celebrities can raise awareness, fundraise, and call people to action far more effectively than a lay person or public servant ever could. The risk of them "making the situation worse" is always there. In my mind, however, doing nothing is always worse than trying to do something.
I enjoyed this question very much because like states people are fairly autonomous actors, especially rich people who have a global audience and maintain passports that can get them wherever they want to go. If a famous person wants to advocate something, they're going to advocate for it and nothing you are I say will change that. But for the sake of argument I would like to take the side of defending celebrity advocacy.
While it is true that celebrities lack a mandate, "competence," and have the possibility of making a situation worse, the sheer number of pros for celebrity activism outweigh those cons. They can act far more quickly in crises than governments or organizations; there are no rules on how they spend money, thereby allowing them to marshal resources quickly and effectively for rapid reaction. They can slide between both the public and private spheres; a celebrity can influence both public and private actors because of their fame, allowing them to assist in positive outcomes for their cause. Some even have access to world leaders, diplomats, and politicians. Most importantly, however, they have access to the public. Celebrities, despite being rich and famous, remain far more relatable to people than a bookish diplomat or politician. When they talk people are already listening closer because, aside from their fame, they communicate on a similar wavelength. They are used to communicating to the public at large. As such, celebrities can raise awareness, fundraise, and call people to action far more effectively than a lay person or public servant ever could. The risk of them "making the situation worse" is always there. In my mind, however, doing nothing is always worse than trying to do something.
Interests as Ideas vs Interests from Ideas
Having read Laffey and Weldes and Keohane and Goldstein and discussed it with the class, I must confess the whole breakdown of Laffey and Weldes is still nebulous and difficult to grasp. Some parts of the argument make sense to me, that the rationalists view ideas and interests as separate and the constructivists view them as one singular entity; in this way you get the interests coming from ideas and interests as ideas scenario.
I will continue to subscribe to the rationalist approach because it is, well, rational. The rationalist approach is an easier method of forecasting actor behavior than the constructivist one as far as ideas and interests go. In my mind as a student of political science that is by far the most important thing. But I cannot discount the constructivist approach out of hand because I know that it is the more realistic of the two, meaning that it seems more in line with human behavior. Laffey and Weldes treat ideas as social, that interests and ideas are symbiotic in that they react with one another and can't exist without one another. These points are true, but in practice become muddled.
The constructivists make good points, though, that undermine the rationalist position, at least as they approach the idea of, well, ideas. The way we look at the world determines how we go about approaching it. As such, our interests are tied to our ideas and cannot be separated. Weber has an even better point, though it is wrapped in a rather haughty and slightly racist essay, that rationality is an idea. Ditching the notion that rationality was developed by Europeans, the statement by itself does stand. People are not inherently rational; indeed rationality is an idea.
This module had my brain doing figure eights, but it also opened up the door for a newfound appreciation of the constructivist approach to IR.
I will continue to subscribe to the rationalist approach because it is, well, rational. The rationalist approach is an easier method of forecasting actor behavior than the constructivist one as far as ideas and interests go. In my mind as a student of political science that is by far the most important thing. But I cannot discount the constructivist approach out of hand because I know that it is the more realistic of the two, meaning that it seems more in line with human behavior. Laffey and Weldes treat ideas as social, that interests and ideas are symbiotic in that they react with one another and can't exist without one another. These points are true, but in practice become muddled.
The constructivists make good points, though, that undermine the rationalist position, at least as they approach the idea of, well, ideas. The way we look at the world determines how we go about approaching it. As such, our interests are tied to our ideas and cannot be separated. Weber has an even better point, though it is wrapped in a rather haughty and slightly racist essay, that rationality is an idea. Ditching the notion that rationality was developed by Europeans, the statement by itself does stand. People are not inherently rational; indeed rationality is an idea.
This module had my brain doing figure eights, but it also opened up the door for a newfound appreciation of the constructivist approach to IR.
Globalization and the End of Anarchy
Nothing in this world is a stronger motivator than money. Let's face it, like people, states are inherently self-interested. People will do just about anything for money, which begs the question, can money make people behave? Can it make states behave?
I thoroughly enjoyed Frieden and Rogowski's work for the sole purpose of their main idea: globalization constrains states. Their premise, and the point of my question above, is that money does make states behave. States love money so much they are willing to constrain themselves to get it. Apply it to organizations like the WTO. The WTO requires that its members submit their autonomy to the organization whenever they are called upon to settle a dispute. States must accept the WTO's decision or risk economic backlash from the other party in the dispute. But what is the alternative? To not be a part of the WTO risks huge loss in trade and economic protection. It is in everybody's benefit to play by the rules and constrain themselves so states go ahead and do it. Such constraint should have realists heading for the hills.
So long as the returns remain high states will continue to integrate, creating more and more constrained state actors. Liberal institutionalists will point to issue linkages, greater absolute gains, and lower risk of cheating being associated with globalization and, therefore, institutionalization. I would argue that that is all very true, but it is money that is going to be the driving force underpinning the system. Money will bring about a more integrated world.
I thoroughly enjoyed Frieden and Rogowski's work for the sole purpose of their main idea: globalization constrains states. Their premise, and the point of my question above, is that money does make states behave. States love money so much they are willing to constrain themselves to get it. Apply it to organizations like the WTO. The WTO requires that its members submit their autonomy to the organization whenever they are called upon to settle a dispute. States must accept the WTO's decision or risk economic backlash from the other party in the dispute. But what is the alternative? To not be a part of the WTO risks huge loss in trade and economic protection. It is in everybody's benefit to play by the rules and constrain themselves so states go ahead and do it. Such constraint should have realists heading for the hills.
So long as the returns remain high states will continue to integrate, creating more and more constrained state actors. Liberal institutionalists will point to issue linkages, greater absolute gains, and lower risk of cheating being associated with globalization and, therefore, institutionalization. I would argue that that is all very true, but it is money that is going to be the driving force underpinning the system. Money will bring about a more integrated world.
Week 15, Post-Class
I think my favorite part of this debate was seeing that, in
the end, most of our arguments relied on each other. I know there were several
times I noticed it in our group’s writing and in our opposing team's arguments. I would read something and think, “you know that could really be turned
around to support the opposing argument…” We have spent a lot of time in class
talking about the ways America is the biggest threat to America and global cooperation but tonight there was an overwhelming presence of the idea that the downfall of
America will be when the world decides they can go on without us.
Whether that means there is a new steward of the
international realm such as China, or people no longer can or want to immigrate
to the states, or that the world is sick of our war mongering, it seems that
one day the US will no longer have the resources or legitimacy to be the
hegemonic power. What’s more, in all our arguments we envisioned a transfer of
power to another party. Although we didn’t all argue for the same type of power
to be transferred – some thought it would be economic power, others security –
there was an implication that a weakened America will not lead to the easing of
sovereignty and towards a world
government but to ad hoc solutions in the areas where the US can no longer
lead.
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We've come a long way in this course. I am glad that Hobbes was the foundation on which we built our learning as it provided a good refe...